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ABSTRACT 
 
 Before January 1811, slave rebellion weighed heavily on the minds of white Louisianans.  
The colonial and territorial history of Louisiana challenged leaders with a diverse and complex 
social environment that required calculated decision-making and a fair hand to navigate.  Racial 
and ethnic divisions forced officials to tread carefully in order to build a prosperous territory 
while maintaining control over the slave population.  Many Louisianans used slave labor to 
produce indigo, cotton, and sugarcane along the rivers of south Louisiana, primarily between 
Baton Rouge and the mouth of the Mississippi River.  For nearly a century, Louisianans avoided 
slave upheaval but after 1791 the colonial and territorial ties to Saint Domingue, the seat of the 
first successful slave revolution in world history, heightened the tension.  Over the course of the 
next twenty years Spanish, French, and American leaders worked diligently to prevent slave 
rebellion in a territory that had slowly become a fertile breeding ground for slave insurrection.  
Eventually the strain overwhelmed territorial leaders when thousands of exiles from the Haitian 
Revolution arrived in Louisiana after a brief period in Cuba.  Social tension, resulting from the 
exponential population growth and the increase of a dangerous ideology developed during their 
experiences with slave insurrection, that the Haitian refugees brought with them.  The territory 
finally succumbed to attempted revolution when Charles Deslondes, a slave on the Manuel 
André plantation, called upon his fellow bondsmen and bondswomen to kill whites and demand 
their own freedom.  
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since their introduction to Louisiana in the 1720s slaves labored in the hot, humid sub-
tropical climate, toiling with their skillful hands to enrich their owners by raising cotton, indigo, 
and sugarcane.  A complex territory with a checkered past, Louisiana challenged French, 
Spanish, and American officials respectively.  Both internal and external challenges forced 
administrators to forge a cohesive society out of a populace fractured by ethnic and racial 
divisions.   
 French and Spanish officials always feared slave rebellion in Louisiana.  The black to 
white population ratio frightened many whites while a tradition of runaways and unexplored 
geography that aided slaves in their clandestine ventures challenged white authority.  Aiming to 
appease the hearts and minds of their chattel, French officials abided by the Code Noir which 
guaranteed slaves certain rights and living conditions.  Unfortunately, the Code failed to 
guarantee anything. It usually resulted in token legislation that lacked genuine enforcement.  
During Spanish occupancy, although French denizens disliked Spanish colonial rule, Louisiana 
slaves and free people of color often benefited from Spain’s liberal racial policies.  Progressive 
when viewed in a relative perspective, Spain’s looser interpretation of racial control altered the 
institution of slavery in Louisiana.  Spanish administrators brought with them more forward-
thinking ideas of how to handle slaves and free people of color.  These more lenient notions 
included the use of free people of color in the militia for territorial defense and more social 
freedoms to slaves and free blacks.  
  The Spanish regime’s relatively liberal treatment of Louisiana African-Americans 
unsettled many whites who feared that the extra freedom encouraged subterfuge and plotting 
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among the enslaved and free black populations.  When the Haitian Revolution erupted in the 
Saint Domingue in 1791, it emitted shockwaves throughout the western world as many witnessed 
the effects of French revolutionary ideology put into practice by black slaves.  Spanish colonial 
authorities in Louisiana rushed to prevent these influences from reaching the shores of the 
territory and did so effectively.  Although the Spanish successfully fended off dangerous 
ideology, American officials quickly became overwhelmed by thousands of exiles.  When the 
Saint Domingue refugees, black and white, enslaved and freed teemed into Louisiana in search 
of a home to start anew, they presented the fledgling American territory with tremendous 
difficulties.   
 The instability created by Louisiana’s complicated past especially threatened Governor 
William Charles Cole Claiborne, the first American administrator in the territory.  With Anglo-
Americans outnumbered by a large French and Spanish majority, Claiborne scrambled to 
promote harmony while introducing American laws and government.  All the while, he tread 
carefully to prevent racial upheaval, a constant concern in any slaveholding society.  Aside from 
the factions, including Americans, French and Spanish Creoles, and free people of color 
grappling for social position, Governor Claiborne soon contended with a population growth that 
immensely increased the likelihood of open conflict.  The Creole population received a 
numerical, ideological, and economic boost from the refugees and many of their slaves.  
Unfortunately for long-time Louisianans, among these refugees were some who possessed 
dangerous ideals founded in the French Revolution despite not participating in the Haitian 
Revolution.  The tension between masters and slaves in Louisiana existed from the beginning of 
interracial contact but the revolutionary ideology necessary to transform the uneasiness into open 
rebellion did not arrive until after the summer of 1809 when the Haitian refugees landed.   
2 
 
 My thesis will seek to examine the scholarship thus far concerning the 1811 slave 
rebellion, to establish the environment in Louisiana leading to the insurrection, to analyze certain 
catalysts that caused the rebellion in 1811, and finally to narrate, as accurately as possible, the 
attempted revolution.  Despite the rebellion’s glaring absence from the mainstream American 
historical narrative, much has been written in the two centuries since the revolt.  Chapter Two 
focuses on the bulk of the scholarship surrounding the insurrection in an attempt to understand 
how historians have explained the rebellion.  Most of the work lacks a wider scope needed to 
help determine the causes of the largest slave revolt in North American history.  Taking into 
account the previous scholarship, I have attempted to move forward in the final three chapters, 
examining the rebellion as accurately as possible in a trans-national perspective and 
incorporating new sources and methods. 
 Chapter Three addresses the environment in Louisiana in which conditions made 
rebellion possible as, over time, the territory became a more fertile breeding ground for slave 
insurrection.  Divided ethnic and racial factions forced administrators to grapple with constant 
internal discord.   Policing the territory throughout the colonial and territorial periods challenged 
territorial leaders as they used militia to combat potential social disturbances including slave 
revolt.  From 1791 on, the Haitian Revolution weighed heavily on the minds of Louisianans both 
white and black.  Many blacks entertained thoughts of enacting their own revolution to overturn 
their masters’ rule in the oppressive climate of the Lower Mississippi Valley.  In contrast, whites 
feared blacks’ interpretation of French revolutionary ideology in Saint Domingue and made 
every effort to prevent any politically contaminated persons from entering Louisiana.   
Chapter Four focuses on the catalysts that finally overwhelmed territorial officials, 
causing the outbreak of January 1811.  The presence of maroon communities and the expulsion 
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of Haitian refugees from Cuba after they had sought asylum on that island plagued Governor 
Claiborne’s efforts to ensure peace.  The maroon communities provided slaves in the river 
parishes above New Orleans with a medium for the transfer of information and an area of space 
where they acted outside their masters’ influence.  Slaves, free people of color, and maroons 
circumnavigated local authorities via these independent communities much as they had on Saint 
Domingue before the revolution of 1791.  Additionally, the refugees pouring into Louisiana 
affected greatly the ability of Governor Claiborne to form a cohesive society.  New cracks split 
along the lines of old divisions under the rapid increase of the black population.   
Placing Louisiana squarely within the context of, first, the Caribbean and then the 
western world as a whole broadens the scope of the traditional historical understanding of the 
revolt.  The fundamental forces behind the rebellion lay partially within the trans-national 
perspective including the French revolutionary ideology and its implementation in Saint 
Domingue.  Initially slaves heard the details of the Haitian Revolution by word of mouth, even in 
their oppressive environment.  After 1809 they began to learn first-hand from the refugees their 
experiences with slave revolution.  Previous histories have not explain how the largest North 
American slave revolt occurred in Louisiana and why the insurrection finally took place in 1811.  
The final chapter addresses the rebellion.  Although at times a bit murky, the details regarding 
the insurrection remain plentiful 
By addressing the attempted revolution from a trans-national perspective, taking into 
account the Haitian Revolution in conjunction with a society torn asunder by racial and ethnic 
tensions, one can begin to explain the 1811 rebellion.  By approaching previously examined 
sources from new angles, I can make better sense of the events that led to the outbreak and 
suppression of the revolt in January 1811.  Broadening the chronological scope of the study 
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allows me to understand the evolution of slavery, colonial and territorial governments, and the 
mounting catalysts that led to a planned open rebellion.  The slaves who participated in the revolt 
did so consciously, not in a spontaneous and unplanned grasp for freedom.  Their attempt to 
achieve freedom in the face of great opposition, and the legacy of independent action that they 
left to the people along the Mississippi River in modern-day Louisiana deserve a fair and 
accurate hearing.  I hope my thesis will help to serve that purpose. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“DEMONIACAL GESTICULATIONS” TO “THE MEMORY OF THE 1811 
MARTYRS”: EVOLVING HISTORIOGRAPHICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE 1811 SLAVE 
INSURRECTION 
 
The existing scholarship that analyzes the 1811 slave revolt along the German Coast in 
Louisiana presents an incomplete, inaccurate, and often racist picture of the actual events.  
Professional and amateur historians alike underplay the importance of the largest slave 
insurrection in United States history.  Scholars have written specific case studies of most major 
slave revolts and conspiracies but continue to ignore the 1811 Louisiana insurrection.  Nat 
Turner, Gabriel Prosser, and Denmark Vesey all receive a greater attention and exploration.1   
Studying those few scholars who have written of the 1811 slave rebellion, one can begin 
to understand the language inherent in the various analyses and styles of interpretation spanning 
150 years of Louisiana historiography from Charles Gayarré in the 1850s to Adam Rothman’s 
2005 study of the American frontier during the antebellum period.  In addition to Gayarré, 
François-Martin Xavier, Alcée Fortier, and John S. Kendall provide the foundation for what 
many historians know of the rebellion.  Unfortunately, most scholars rely upon these earlier 
historians who suffered from racist social agendas that clouded their works with glaring 
inaccuracies as well as the language of a different era.  One must understand early scholars in a 
different light, as men of their time with racial attitudes different from the modern historian.2     
                                                 
1 For specific case studies of slave revolts and conspiracies consult William Styron, Confessions of Nat 
Turner (New York: Random House, 1967); Kenneth Greenberg, Nat Turner: A Slave Rebellion in History and 
Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); David Robertson, Denmark Vesey (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1999); Robert Starobin, Denmark Vesey: The Slave Conspiracy of 1822 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1970); Douglas R. Egerton, Gabriel’s Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800 and 1802 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). 
 
2 Most historians consider Martin Gayarré, François-Xavier Martin, and Alceé Fortier to be the fathers of 
Louisiana history.  Their early and wide-ranging histories of the state provide modern scholars with a starting point 
for their studies but fail to cite the origin of their information.  Charles Gayarré, History of Louisiana [hereafter 
Gayarré] 1903 (New Orleans: F.F. Hansell & Bro., Ltd., 1867); François-Xavier Martin, The History of Louisiana 
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 Born in New Orleans in 1805, Charles Gayarré, became the earliest recognized Louisiana 
historian.  Despite the absence of citations and its unabashed white elitist perspective, Gayarré‘s 
four-volume history of Louisiana provides a starting point for an analysis the 1811 revolt.  He 
noted that the insurrection occurred as Louisianans fought for statehood and admission into the 
United States.3  Gayarré claimed that these congressional and territorial debates became 
secondary once the slaves in St. Charles Parish revolted.  Initially published before the Civil 
War, Gayarré’s coverage of the rebellion ultimately sought to legitimize the institution of slavery 
and the harsh treatment of Louisiana slaves.    
Providing a few details of the rebellion, Gayarré suggested that the revolt began on the 
“left bank of the Mississippi, about thirty-six miles above the city of New Orleans.”4  He 
recounted the orderly manner with which the slaves advanced toward New Orleans, organizing 
into companies under the command of officers and marching to the beat of drums, in military 
fashion.  With disdain for the rebelling slaves, he narrated the encounter between Jean-François 
Trépagnier, a planter, and the servile army.  When the “Bacchanalian shouts” alerted the planter 
of their arrival, Trépagnier loaded his shotgun with buckshot and faced them from “a high 
circular gallery which belted his house.”  Upon noticing the planter’s commanding position 
overlooking the approach to his house, the slaves “wavered, lacked self-sacrificing devotion to 
accomplish their end, and finally passed on, after having vented their disappointed wrath in 
fearful shrieks and demoniacal gesticulations.”5  Revealing himself as a man of his time, Gayarré 
suggested that the encounter on the Trépagnier plantation “shows how little that population is to 
                                                                                                                                                             
From the Earliest Period 1963 (New Orleans: Pelican Publishing Company, 1882); Alcée Fortier, A History of 
Louisiana (New York: Manzi, Joyant & Co., Successors, 1904). 
 
3Gayarré, 4: 264-66.  Charles Gayarré was the grandson of the first mayor during American rule, Etienne de 
Boré, and was born on the de Boré plantation, present-day Audubon Park. 
4 Gayarré, 4:266. 
 
5 Gayarré, 4:266-67. 
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be dreaded, when confronted by the superior race whose care Providence has intrusted their 
protection and gradual civilization.”6   
 Gayarré’s social commentary, grating to the modern ear, continued as he declared the 
rebellion to be nothing more than a “foolish attempt at gaining a position in society, which, for 
the welfare of their own race, will ever be denied to it in the Southern States of North America.”7  
The early historian reported that the slaves suffered sixty-six dead on site, and sixteen prisoners 
taken to New Orleans for trial, but he falsely claimed that “most prisoners were hung on the 
spot.”8  Gayarré believed the fugitive slaves who survived the revolt fled into surrounding 
swamps to avoid capture.  Following the trial and execution of the slaves who participated, 
United States troops and a portion of the militia continued to regularly scour the area along the 
German Coast to ensure the planters’ tranquility. 
 In 1882, François-Xavier Martin wrote a sweeping survey of the entire course of 
Louisiana history from the moment European explorers first discovered its meandering bayous to 
its secession from the Union preceding the American Civil War.  In a history so vast, Martin 
devoted only one paragraph to the slave 1811 insurrection.  He had many details wrong, but 
Martin recounted the rebellion without the significant racial bias.  According to Martin, as the 
rebels proceeded downriver, they met Major Homer Virgil Milton and General Wade Hampton 
who overwhelmed them.  But Martin did not mention Colonel Manuel André’s participation in 
the rebellion and generally failed to detail the location of important phases during the revolt.  He 
simply concluded his account by discussing the fate of the slaves.  In addition to the sixty-six 
killed during the rebellion in Martin’s account, the captured rebels “were convicted and 
                                                 
6 Gayarré, 4: 267. 
 
7 Gayarré, 4:267. 
 
8 Ibid., 4:267. 
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executed.  Their heads were placed on high poles, above and below the city, and along the river 
as far as the plantation on which the revolt began, and on those on which they had committed 
devastation.”9  Unclouded with the racism inherent in Gayarré’s earlier or Kendall’s later essay, 
Martin’s history of the rebellion serves as a good early account of the insurrection. 
 Writing an early defining piece, often relied upon by historians studying the revolt, John 
S. Kendall, in 1939, discussed the rebellion and the pall that lay over New Orleans afterwards.  
Correctly drawing a parallel to the Haitian Revolution, Kendall declared “only by the narrowest 
of margins had the state escaped a repetition of the brutal and sanguinary scenes which had 
marked the servile revolt in Hayti.”10  Kendall asserted that the slaves had acted out of mere 
savagery and that the white soldiers and militiamen had successfully performed their ultimate 
duty by saving Louisianans from eternal barbarism.  Justifying increased racial control, he 
excused Americans who arrived in Louisiana after the insurrection for treating “the blacks with 
consideration, even with affection; [because] they had not been here when the blacks rose.”11 
 Kendall’s narrative of the slave revolt, littered with racial judgments and exaggerations, 
encourages the reader to identify with the plight of the white man, cast down before the 
“savages… [and] howling mob with the announced intention of murdering their masters and 
burning or laying waste property.”12  In Kendall’s telling, white planters and their families fled 
toward New Orleans and sought refuge from nearly five hundred rebel slaves.  Kendall correctly 
assumed that many of those who revolted had earlier participated in the Haitian Revolution.  
                                                 
9 Martin, 349.  Essentially, Fortier tells the same, simplified story of the rebellion. 
 
10 John S. Kendall, “Shadow Over the City,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly 22 (January 1939), 4. 
 
11 Kendall, 5. 
 
12 Ibid., 5. 
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Their experience helped fuel the rebellion as the slaves marched downriver, gaining numerical 
strength at each plantation they passed and burning five planters’ homes.13 
 Possessing a flair for the dramatic, Kendall wrote a momentous and celebratory account 
of Trépaginer’s conflict with the rebel slaves.  “One white man alone had the temerity to dispute 
their advance,” Kendall declared, “let his name be remembered, for what he did was a gallant 
thing.”14  Twenty-five miles above New Orleans lay the Trépagnier plantation where the planter 
stood fast against the approaching slaves, successfully diverting them from his property by 
taking the point on his veranda with firearms loaded with buckshot.  Trépagnier saved his 
plantation from the “growling and gesticulating” slaves, and Kendall suggested that “records of 
the South contain no finer example of calm courage.”15  Shortly thereafter, the rebel slaves, 
driven from the Trépagnier plantation, encountered organized resistance from militia newly-
arrived from Baton Rouge under the command of Major Hilton.  Additionally, Kendall claimed 
that General Wade Hampton had arrived from New Orleans with a detachment of militia, though 
he actually commanded United States regulars.  The slave army, poorly armed and no match for 
its opponent, quickly broke in the face of stiff, organized resistance.   
 By Kendall’s estimate, the slaves suffered sixty-six dead, sixteen taken prisoner, and an 
unknown number wounded.  Transporting the captive slaves to New Orleans, authorities tried 
and executed the slaves for “the revolt of the slave against his lawful master,” at the Place d’ 
Armes in front of Saint Louis Cathedral.  The remnants of the rebellion fled into nearby swamps 
and wooded areas, their wounded expiring without adequate medical attention. According to 
Kendall, “every day for a long time afterwards, additional bodies were discovered in these 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Kendall, 5-6. 
 
15 Kendall, 6. 
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gloomy retreats, where some badly injured black had gasped out his last breath in the still, dark 
solitudes.”16   
 In explaining the rebellion’s origins, John Kendall placed heavy blame on the Baratarian 
pirates operating in the swamps of south Louisiana because of their clandestine smuggling of 
slaves and goods including arms and ammunition.17  The historian argued that Governor 
Claiborne wished to extirpate the pirates operating in the swamps who had allegedly sold stolen 
slaves to planters in Saint John the Baptist and Saint Charles Parishes.  According to Kendall, 
however, the territorial council declined Claiborne’s request to attack the pirate stronghold, 
preferring to close its eyes to the matter.  Kendall argued that it was in this manner that slaves 
who possessed the dangerous revolutionary ideology that inspired the 1811 insurrection had 
entered the German Coast.  Thus began a period of harsher treatment of slaves by their masters 
because “one must hold the reins tight over the blacks.  They must know who were their 
masters.”18  Kendall’s analysis easily becomes a target for criticism.  Serving as a justification 
for white superiority and the harsh treatment of Louisiana slaves during the antebellum period, 
Kendall did not really understand the 1811 insurrection.   
 Nearly four decades passed before James H. Dormon provided a model for any 
examination of the revolt, writing in 1977 the most influential study of the 1811 rebellion in the 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
 
17The most famous of these pirates, Jean Lafitte stars in more than just another mythical story in Louisiana 
lore. In his recent study of the Lafitte pirates, William C. Davis refutes Kendall’s claim of Baratarian involvement, 
claiming that Kendall “says without citing any authority that slaves introduced into Louisiana by the Baratarians 
may have been behind the January 1811 uprising.”  William C. Davis, The Pirates Lafitte: The Treacherous World 
of the Corsairs of the Gulf (Orlando, Fl: Harcourt, Inc., 2005), 529. 
 
18 Kendall, 7. 
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context of Territorial Louisiana.19  His efforts spearheaded a movement toward a more objective 
investigation of the revolt, seeking to counter and overturn the narratives provided by Gayarré, 
Martin, and Kendall.  Dormon’s study approached the insurrection from a closed territorial 
perspective, meaning he worked to understand the rebellion on a local level void of external 
influences.   He hinted at potential outside catalysts, suggesting complex influences from foreign 
powers and Louisiana’s factional history, but did not pursue them.  Dormon succeeded in 
presenting the finest and most objective narrative of the 1811 slave rebellion to date. 
 In Louisiana, Dormon wrote, “clearly, then, the specter of black insurrection was a 
constant reality in the minds of whites.”20  He correctly argued that white fears ebbed and flowed 
throughout the colonial and territorial periods.  Dormon agreed with earlier analyses when he 
stated that the rebellion began in the late evening of January 8, 1811, on or near the plantation of 
Colonel Manuel André, thirty-six miles northwest of New Orleans near present-day Norco.  Led 
by Charles Deslondes, the insurgent slaves assaulted their owners, wounded Colonel André, 
murdered his son, Gilbert, and then fled downriver in the direction of New Orleans.21  In his 
analysis, Dormon differed from earlier historians by suggesting that the slaves had calculated 
their movements carefully.  Previously failing to grant the enslaved Africans the agency to plan 
such a grand scheme, scholars had suggested that the revolt began as a spontaneous riot that 
exploded into a full-scale rebellion.   
 Dormon suggested that Colonel André, wounded yet determined to suppress the slave 
rebellion, immediately gathered a force consisting of local militia and vigilantes to pursue the 
                                                 
19 James H. Dormon, “The Persistent Specter: Slave Rebellion in Territorial Louisiana,” Louisiana History 
18 (Fall 1977), 389-404. 
 
20 Dormon, 392. 
 
21 Dormon, 394 
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rebels as they proceeded downriver.  At André’s suggestion, Claiborne ordered regular United 
States Army troops under General Wade Hampton out of New Orleans toward the scene of the 
insurrection and “a company of dragoons and one of light artillery under command of Major 
Homer Virgil Milton,” to meet them.22  André’s men met the rebels at François Bernard 
Bernoudi’s plantation, and attacked Deslondes’ force, which stood firm, contrary to previous 
narratives that had the slaves fleeing without much of a fight.  As Dormon suggests, the slaves 
“were woefully deficient in firepower and in military organization,” and soon realized the futility 
of their struggle.  Many fled into the woods.23  According to Dormon, Hampton and Milton 
joined forces at the Destrehan Plantation on the morning of January 11.  By that evening the 
entire insurrection had been dispatched by the unified force of militia, vigilantes, and regular 
United States troops.24  
In addition to providing an unbiased account of the revolt, Dormon uncovered vital 
primary documents in the St. Charles Parish Original Acts, court records from the trial for the 
captured slaves that detail the rebellion.  The testimony within these court records provides the 
only opportunity for historians to piece together the role of individual slaves in the planning and 
carrying out of the 1811 uprising.  These sources provide testimonial information that discusses 
individual slaves and their part in the rebellion, knowledge previously unavailable when earlier 
historians attempted to ascertain the African-American viewpoint.     
 In evaluating the cost of the rebellion, Dormon concluded that two whites died, Gilbert 
André and Jean-François Trépagnier, who according to previous historians’ accounts, had 
valiantly and effectively driven the slaves from his plantation.  The Territorial Legislature, at the 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 396. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Ibid., 397. 
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behest of Governor Claiborne, reimbursed planters one-third of the appraised value of each 
house burned during the insurrection.  The act for reimbursement also called upon the territory to 
pay $300 for each slave lost to execution or conflict during the rebellion.   
Dormon’s analysis and his use of primary documents make his 1977 narrative an 
invaluable resource for understanding the 1811 rebellion.  As historians move forward with more 
detailed analyses of the revolt, his work should serve as the foundation for their studies.  Dormon 
called upon future historians to achieve a higher standard of scholarship, declaring that the 
details of the uprising “lend themselves to a new consideration of the subject, and hopefully, 
additional light on some, though by no means, all of the dark corners of the problem.”25   
 In a 1986 master’s thesis, Morris Lewis Witten examined the history of slave unrest in 
colonial and territorial Louisiana.26  She states correctly that Louisiana slave historiography 
suffers from a reliance on the early narratives of Gayarré, Martin, Fortier, and Kendall.  Since 
Witten, scholars including Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Walter Johnson, and Richard Follett have 
made significant strides for a better understanding of Louisiana slavery, but a thorough and 
reliable analysis of slave dissent, specifically the 1811 rebellion, remains glaringly absent from 
the historiographical record.27  
                                                 
25 Dormon, 391. 
 
26 Morris Lewis Witten, “Rumors, Runaways, Revolt!: An Overview of Slave Unrest in Colonial and 
Territorial Louisiana” (master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1986). 
 
27 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the 
Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992) discusses slavery from a cultural 
perspective and helps to inform the conditions of slavery that aided in leading to the insurrection but does not 
address the 1811 rebellion.  Dr. Hall is currently working on an upcoming publication that will shed some light on 
participants of the revolt.  Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1999) examines the domestic slave trade, focusing heavily on activity in Louisiana but 
touches little on the resistance inherent in slavery.  Richard Follett, The Sugar Masters: Planters and Slaves in 
Louisiana’s Cane World, 1820-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005) details the sugar empire 
that developed in the Lower Mississippi Valley.  While outside of Follett’s chronological scope, he still mentions the 
attempted revolution but does not detail the longer-lasting effects upon the planters’ mentality that developed in 
reaction to the 1811 insurrection.  
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  Witten provides a reliable account of the 1811 rebellion.  Aiming to analyze the rebellion 
objectively, she overcomes the pitfalls of previous scholars.  Witten thoughtfully examines the 
inconsistencies among early historians’ works and more recent scholarship, interjecting evidence 
from her own new source material along the way.  The result, a critical historiography of 
Louisiana slave unrest, provides a vital starting point for historians who wish to conduct a 
thorough examination of Louisiana slave history.  Her narrative, while solid, lacks the 
sophistication of a broader analysis that takes into account the factors that caused the rebellion at 
the moment and place that it occurred.       
Expanding the scope of Louisiana slave insurrection studies by researching the effect the 
1811 slave revolt had on the country at large four years later, Thomas Thompson correctly 
proclaims a need to examine the insurrection within the context of the United States as a whole 
to determine its effect on the national mentality.28  While reliable, his is a limited study.  He 
draws chiefly from accounts appearing in newspapers throughout the United States.  He fails to 
cite directly from the newspapers during his project, essentially paraphrasing the articles in his 
own words.  Unfortunately, the way in which Thompson paraphrases his sources, makes the 
reader assume that the original documents give a much different story than that Thompson 
presents.  For example, he writes, after vacating the André plantation, where the revolt began, the 
servile army stopped at the Fortier plantation where they “raided it, cooked, ate, and frolicked to 
the point of near riot.”29  Thompson notes that the slave army raided the liquor stores of the 
André plantation before setting off down the river road.  Considering the sources he investigates 
                                                 
28 Thomas M. Thompson, “National Newspaper and Legislative Reactions to Louisiana’s Deslondes Slave 
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for his examination of the rebellion, reporting these accounts of the revolt as fact seems 
irresponsible.    
 Thompson expresses his belief that news of the rebellion helped the vast majority of 
white inhabitants in the path of the advancing rebels find asylum in New Orleans before the 
danger could reach them.  Ignoring the death of Colonel André’s son, Thompson incorrectly 
denoted Trépagnier as the lone white casualty during the rebellion.  On the other hand, he spared 
the historiographical record from repeating the dramatic tale of Trépagnier’s stand on his 
veranda.  Thompson also reported three plantation houses burned but nothing else.30  On both 
accounts, he differs from Kendall’s and Gayarré’s early narratives which gave entirely different 
stories of the Trépagnier conflict and both claimed a loss of five burned plantation homes.   
 According to Thompson, when the rebel slaves encountered the militia and regular troops 
on the Fortier plantation, the revolt broke up quickly.  He reports sixty-six dead, sixteen captives, 
and seventeen unaccounted for but later suggests that the authorities held seventy-five slaves in 
captivity, many of whom the administrators returned to their owners.  He presents these statistics 
without citing the source of his information.31  Of particular interest, however, Thompson found 
published lists in New Orleans newspapers naming the slaves accused of rebellion and pleading 
for information concerning the slaves listed.  Local authorities hoped to use this information 
during captives’ trial.32    
For the first time in any of the accounts of the rebellion, Thompson argues that the slaves 
spent a week of interrogation at the hands of the Saint Charles Parish district court while 
detained on the Jean Noel Destrehan plantation.  The Destrehan plantation, near the point where 
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the rebellion fell apart, became the focal point of the interrogation and trial.  Jean Noel 
Destrehan, president of the Louisiana territorial legislature in 1806 and 1811, was a well-
respected planter with powerful connections in both the local and national governments.33  The 
trial commenced on January 13, presided over by Judge Pierre Bauchet Saint Martin who 
appointed a tribunal of five plantation owners, some of whom had experienced property damage 
during the insurrection.  After requiring only one day to decide the forgone fate of the captured 
slaves, Thompson claims the tribunal sentenced eighteen slaves to execution by being taken to 
the plantation of their owner and shot.  Thompson agrees with early accounts that authorities 
placed the heads of the executed slaves on pikes along the river between New Orleans and the 
André plantation to serve as a grisly warning to those hoping to attempt a revolution of their 
own.  Thompson also alludes to nine other slaves, three of whom the tribunal released, three 
executed, and three whose whereabouts have never been discovered.  Thompson places the total 
of executed slaves at twenty-one, five more than suggested by any previous historian.34   
 Thompson’s greatest contribution to the historiographical record is his use of the national 
newspapers that provide new avenues to study the 1811 revolt.  The best accounts came from 
Louisianans writing to distant family members or sending letters to the editor of newspapers 
themselves. The first-hand narratives offer a better opportunity to examine the insurrection from 
the viewpoint of those in the path of the rebellion rather than white administrators who often left 
behind self-serving documents.  Particularly beneficial in Thompson’s findings were articles that 
appeared in the Baltimore American and Commercial Daily Advertiser and Raleigh Star 
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discussing troop maneuvers and providing a detailed analysis of the actions taken by both sides 
during the conflict on the Fortier plantation.35   
 On occasion, news of the revolt transcended the insurrection itself, assuming an entirely 
new focus in different regions of the United States.  Many northern and New England 
newspapers printed accounts of the event including scathing reviews of the treatment of 
Louisiana slaves and the harsh suppression of the rebellion.  Thompson correctly concludes that 
the 1811 revolt exposed additional regions of the country to the horrors of slavery.  According to 
Thompson, accounts of the rebellion helped fuel the fire of hatred for the institution of slavery by 
illustrating its illegitimacy in practice.  Some northerners also used the insurrection to support 
their argument that Louisiana not be admitted into the United States, citing their fear that 
Louisiana posed an ideological and institutional threat to national stability and harmony.  He 
suggests that the insurrection helped spur the abolitionist movement that would gain strength 
through the antebellum period but Thompson ultimately fails to prove this part of his argument.36     
 Providing one of the most recent investigations of the 1811 slave insurrection, Junius P. 
Rodriguez analyzes the effect that the rebellion had on Louisiana’s mentality as the territory 
prepared for entrance into the Union.  Rodriguez claims that the people of Louisiana 
acknowledged “the reality of their precarious situation, and living with the added burden of fear 
and paranoia engendered by it…victimized themselves by their own design.”37  Rodriguez 
means that, through discrimination and their desire to subjugate an entire race, white Louisianans 
subjected themselves to a fear so passionate that not even they enjoyed freedom.   
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 Rodriguez presents a thought-provoking analysis of the militia’s inability to protect the 
territory from lawlessness and disorder.  He contends that the militia “existed for ceremonial 
rather than practical purposes” and that Claiborne “sidestepped the issue by turning to a more 
experienced [General Hampton] to command local forces and restore law and order.”38  While 
Claiborne called upon General Hampton to lead the thirty regular soldiers under his command 
and a hand-picked group of militia, his foresight and ongoing struggle to maintain an adequate 
militia helped to suppress the eventual insurrection.   
 The most lengthy and ambitious study of the 1811 revolt, Albert Thrasher’s 1996 On to 
New Orleans!: Louisiana’s Heroic Slave Revolt remains, to date, the only study focused solely 
on the 1811 slave rebellion.39  At first glance, Thrasher’s effort seems like an exciting work but 
the reader quickly encounters a problematic book.  Published privately by Cypress Press, in 
conjunction with the African American History Alliance of Louisiana, the study obviously 
pursues an agenda.  Tipping his hand and revealing his bias on one occasion, Thrasher described 
Louisiana historian Joe Gray Taylor as “another well known spokesman for the slaveowners and 
the present day capitalist class…[who] also admired the organization of the rebel slaves.”40  If 
Gayarré suffered from an overarching racist historical perspective seeking to legitimize whites’ 
efforts to suppress blacks in Louisiana, Albert Thrasher hopes to justify the actions of the 
insurrectionary slaves and help Charles Deslondes ascend to martyr status.     
 Thrasher begins his examination in Africa where thousands of Africans found themselves 
wrested from their homelands and transported across the Atlantic to the New World.  He 
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discusses the savagery of the international slave trade but subscribes to the theory that, while 
chattel, enslaved Africans generally maintained some semblance of their unique native culture, 
even if they created an amalgamation of diverse African cultures.41  Turning his attention to the 
New World, Thrasher focuses his analysis on the systems of slavery in place on Saint Domingue 
and in Louisiana.  Rapidly surveying the social history of slavery in both colonies, Thrasher sets 
the scene for the successful revolution in Saint Domingue, followed by the attempted revolution 
in Louisiana.     
 Drawing parallels to Saint Domingue, Thrasher argues that the 1811 revolt in Louisiana 
tied directly to the Haitian Revolution, resulting from the ideology and population entering 
Louisiana after 1791.   Although he overstates the link, Thrasher successfully examines the 
revolt in a transnational context, the first scholar to do so.  But attempting to understand the 
complexity of the factors acting to encourage the insurrection, he fails to push them far enough.  
Thrasher gets too caught up in identifying with his subjects to analyze adequately the political 
environment in territorial Louisiana on the eve of the rebellion.   
 After laying the groundwork for the 1811 insurrection, Thrasher offers a narration of the 
rebellion.  He bases his account on an impressive array of sources including newspapers, city 
council minutes, and court and interrogation records, but often inserts his own conjecture as to 
what might have occurred, at times making up his own narrative.  Historians may never know 
what happened during the planning stages of the revolt because of its secretive nature but 
Thrasher states, without citation, that the slaves likely “sealed the compact with a blood oath to 
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gain freedom or die in the process.”42  Valiantly attempting to raise the participants of the failed 
revolution to martyrdom, Thrasher often becomes a victim of over-dramatization.  He concludes 
his analysis by calling upon the current generation to hearken to the days of the 1811 rebellion, 
hoping to instill in today’s youth a better understanding of their ancestors.  “In our struggle 
today, we must have the same boldness, far reaching aims, courage, indefatigable determination 
and valor in approaching all the problems confronting the revolution,” Thrasher exclaimed, “To 
do less would be not to honor, but to degrade the memory of the 1811 martyrs.”43 
 For the first time in the historiographical record of the Louisiana slave revolt, Thrasher 
suggests an additional branch in the plot to overtake the entire region.  Arguing for an entirely 
undiscovered and unsuccessful wing of the initial plan by the slaves, Thrasher suggests that 
slaves in New Orleans factored heavily into plans to capture the city, thus repeating the events of 
Saint Domingue.  While Deslondes led his servile army toward New Orleans, slaves and willing 
free people of color within city limits would storm the armory at Fort St. Charles in search of 
arms and ammunition.  Details remain sketchy, but Thrasher uncovered evidence in New 
Orleans’ newspapers that suggests an increase in runaways throughout Orleans Parish on the eve 
of the rebellion.  Additionally, he found reliable concerns on the part of the garrison at Fort St. 
Charles pertaining to disturbances among the city’s population. 44  Unfortunately these 
disturbances, even if real, were not mentioned in Claiborne’s correspondence.  The governor said 
nothing of revolt within the city, but his decision to withhold such knowledge may have been a 
calculated omission.  Likely, Claiborne wished to present the impression that he maintained 
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control over the fledgling territory as it progressed toward statehood.  Thrasher presents a new 
direction for future historians who may succeed in uncovering new details that will expand the 
scope of the 1811 rebellion. 
Thrasher’s sources provide an excellent basis for further research and consideration, but 
he often fails to provide citations for information that he presents as factual.  The language he 
employs prevents him from providing an objective picture as well.  Constantly referring 
mockingly to “loyal slaves” who warned their masters of the rebellion, allowing them to flee to 
New Orleans, the author appears to hope the reader will feel spite for these men and women.  
Serious historians must ignore the tone of Thrasher’s writing, which fills the audience with a 
sense of compassion for the slaves who found themselves “massacred” during the rebellion, and 
focus instead on the content and source material Thrasher has masterfully conducted.   
Recently studying the settlement and foundation of plantation culture in the Deep South, 
Adam Rothman, dedicated a few pages to the 1811 rebellion and its influence on slavery and 
commerce in lower Louisiana.  Declaring an examination of the 1811 insurrection crucial to his 
overarching thesis, Rothman shows that the event “expressed the deep discontent among 
enslaved people who endured the first phase of the sugar boom in lower Louisiana, and also 
because it starkly exposed the overwhelming military force that always buttressed slavery but 
was rarely apparent.”45  Rothman correctly concludes that the knowledge historians have 
produced thus far originates from sources influenced directly by the suppressors of the rebellion, 
asserting they “reveal more about how the rebellion ended than why it began.”46  Modern 
historians must seek both to understand the reason behind historical events and to provide the 
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narrative of the event.  This thesis attempts to fill, in partiality, the requirement for a better 
assessment behind the causes of the 1811 insurrection.   
Following a brief summary of slavery along the German Coast on the eve of 1811 and a 
rapid analysis of potential external political factors, including Governor Claiborne’s tribulations 
with the Spanish government, Rothman discusses the revolt itself.  Objectively narrating the 
rebellion, he gives more detail than previous scholars.  By actually naming slaves and their 
owners, Rothman takes a significant step closer to painting a clearer picture of the insurrection.  
Other historians used court records to draw conclusions about the slaves’ movements but failed 
to name them, granting them individuality.  Rothman’s efforts fuel historians’ hope of acquiring 
a potential narrative from the viewpoint of the enslaved participants, a picture earlier scholars 
ignored or thought hopeless. 
Rothman concludes his examination of the 1811 rebellion stating that it illustrated the 
tenuous environment in Louisiana as it entered the antebellum period.  As the bulk of the 
southern wilderness and southwestern frontier affirmed its dedication to cotton production, “the 
rise of a sugar plantation complex in lower Louisiana forced the United States to confront the 
contradictory legacies emanating from Saint Domingue.”47  Louisiana’s close relationship to the 
site of the Haitian Revolution forced planters to grapple with a dangerous ideology and the 
ingredients for the replication of the events on that island on American soil.   
Historians must necessarily rely on a transnational analysis and the willingness to look at 
the complex picture, crossing territorial borders to examine and understand Louisiana history, 
particularly the history of the 1811 revolt.  No study discussed in this chapter has yet capitalized 
fully on the source material and methodology to understand thoroughly the insurrection, thus 
presenting the need and opportunity for such an ambitious historical project.  The eventual revolt 
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did not simply happen unabated and spontaneously.  It resulted from years of uneasiness and 
various challenges that pressured local administrators in Louisiana immensely.  The following 
three chapters will seek to use the historiographical record as a model and attain a progressive, 
fresh understanding of the 1811 slave rebellion in Louisiana. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“IT REQUIRES ALL MY VIGILANCE TO PREVENT DISORDERS” 
 
 
On the eve of 1791 the western world experienced a significant series of events that 
caused a real transformation.  The French Enlightenment, characterized by men who “promoted 
and popularized new notions of individual and collective liberty, of political rights, of equality, 
and to a certain extent, of democracy,” surged through much of the Atlantic World.48  During 
what Lester Langley designates the “Age of Revolutions,” French citizens became an example 
for the slaves and free people of color in Saint Domingue, France’s wealthiest colony during the 
eighteenth century, who adhered to the revolutionary ideology inherent in the French 
Enlightenment. 49   When the French National Assembly penned the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man in 1791, it declared as natural inalienable rights popular sovereignty and the right to 
determine one’s own status in society.  As the ideology of the Enlightenment Era 
circumnavigated the Atlantic World, those who encountered it adapted the ideals to their own 
needs.   
Early on, the revolutionary ideology found open arms and curious minds in Louisiana.  
Culturally dominated by France, though politically controlled by Spain since 1763, the territory 
of Louisiana became fertile ground for the ideas and practices of the French Enlightenment. 
When the slave insurrection in Saint Domingue provide another example, ever closer to 
Louisiana, whereby Enlightenment ideology sparked violent revolution and the casting aside of 
authoritative power, many Louisianans watched tensely, fearing the effect it might have on the 
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colony.  Ripples sent forth by the Haitian Revolution washed ashore and began to upset the 
social order within the Creole colony in ways that would only surface after it became an 
American territory.50   
Initially settled by France during the eighteenth century, Louisiana never fully realized its 
potential until after the United States assumed control in 1803.  A colony at the margin of 
empire, Louisiana lacked the stalwart support of initially French and later Spanish officials 
required to sustain a thriving colony.  Plantation and small-scale agriculture dominated the 
Lower Mississippi Valley, capitalizing on the nutrient-rich sediment deposited annually by the 
Mississippi River.  Founded in 1718, New Orleans became the epicenter for activity in Louisiana 
as it sat atop a high area in the vast swamps that surrounded Lake Ponchartrain and along a sharp 
bend in the Mississippi River.  Planters spread out along the river, clearing swampland to begin 
growing indigo and cotton.  In the hot Louisiana climate, planters turned to enslaved Africans to 
work their plantations.  Necessary for the production of increasingly valuable cash crops, 
Africans soon outnumbered whites.   
The inhabitants of Louisiana often found themselves pawns of European diplomacy 
between Spain and France.  Distrust and uncertainty existed from the moment Louisiana came 
under Spanish control in 1763 following the Treaty of Paris51  Reluctant subjects of Spain from 
the beginning, French Louisianans needed little motivation to oppose the Spanish administration 
between 1763 and 1800.  They disliked the Spanish so much that they refused to allow the first 
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Spanish governor, Antonio de Ulloa, to take control of Louisiana.  In March 1766, the Spanish 
Crown sent de Ulloa to oversee the territory, but with only ninety soldiers accompanying him, he 
could not prevent the rioting that broke out.   The French colonists forced him to leave, in what 
became known as the Rebellion of 1768.  Determined to gain control of the colony, Spain sent 
General Alejandro O’Reilly and an army of occupation to Louisiana in 1769, ending the 
bloodless Rebellion of 1768.  Political dissidence between French and Spanish Creoles continued 
to frustrate the Spanish governors, threatening them with open conflict.52 
Immediately after assuming the governor-generalship of Louisiana in 1791, François 
Louis Hector, Baron de Carondelet, realized that “his subjects were entertaining a lively interest 
in the revolution in France.”  Carondelet noticed among the French already dissatisfied with 
Spanish rule “aphorisms and philosophies of the French Revolution [that] were being repeated 
on the streets of New Orleans” by its French citizens. 53  Survivors of the Haitian Revolution 
alerted friends and family in Louisiana of what had transpired on the island and some sought 
refuge in Louisiana.  Disdain for Spanish governance on the part of the French Creoles, in 
addition to the slaves’ dissatisfaction for their own plight, made the colony fertile ground for 
radical ideology. 
Unbeknownst to Louisianans for two years, Napoleon regained control of the territory as 
a result of the 1800 Treaty of Ildefonso.  The Haitian Revolution had disrupted Napoleon’s plans 
to use Louisiana as a stronghold in the New World.  Losing the revenue from Saint Domingue, 
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and experiencing the decimation of the occupation army he had sent to retake the island, he made 
the decision to sell Louisiana.  The financial gains from selling the colony and his failure to 
assert himself in the Western Hemisphere forced Napoleon to consider seriously a deal with the 
United States for the purchase of the territory.  Negotiations reached a conclusion in 1803, and 
the United States purchased Louisiana for fifteen million dollars.54  Control of the territory was 
publicly transferred from Spain to France on November 30, 1803, and three weeks later, on 
December 20, passed to America.55  The takeover by the United States prompted a concerted 
effort to Americanize or Anglicize the Territory of Louisiana.   
Pierre Clément de Laussat, a forty-six-year-old member of the French legislature received 
an appointment from Napoleon as envoy to oversee the transfer of Louisiana to American 
control.  Explaining some of the issues his fellow Frenchmen had with the Spanish 
administration, he exclaimed, “what a detestable policy was that of the Spanish government!  
What dishonest manipulation!  What corruption!”56   Creoles resisted Spanish rule for quite 
some time, unfortunately, foreseeing little reprieve under American rule until after the War of 
1812. 
During the first year of his tenure, governor of American Louisiana, twenty-eight year-
old William Charles Cole Claiborne described the territory’s complexity and the challenges he 
faced in attempting to introduce American government and laws.   Particularly frustrating for 
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him, Claiborne spoke of the “various and rapid rapid transitions and transfers which [had] taken 
place in [the] Territory.”57  Although used to shifts in governance, the inhabitants of Louisiana 
had not yet adjusted to the monumental change of an entirely new central government ruling 
closer to home.  Claiborne tackled the task of balancing prominent factions—including the 
French and Spanish, Americans, gen des couleur libres or free people of color, and enslaved 
Africans—all within a confined territory.58   
Claiborne faced many concurrent internal and external obstacles as he attempted to forge 
a new American territory out of an old Creole colony.  To his administration and political 
superior, Secretary of State Madison, he complained: 
To conciliate public opinion, and to promote Harmony, have been my favorite objects:-
but I have been less fortunate, than I had anticipated!-Unfortunate Divisions, certainly 
exist in Louisiana; but the seeds of discontent, were sown, previous to my arrival in the 
province, and they have deriv’d nourishment from causes, which I cou’d neither controul 
or counteract.59 
 
Assuming control of Louisiana in December 1803, Claiborne entered into a volatile environment 
with many difficulties beyond his control.  Social and political differences marked the territory.  
Claiborne understood the importance of a society working cooperatively toward statehood and 
hoped he could unify the inhabitants.   
After its establishment as a colony, Louisiana experienced an influx of many peoples, 
including Germans who settled in the area that became known as the German Coast, the parishes 
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along the Mississippi River just above New Orleans.60  Additionally, in the 1750s following the 
Great Expulsion, when British officials forced French Acadians out of Nova Scotia, many chose 
to resettle in Louisiana.61  Early in the nineteenth century, after Spain forced French exiles in 
Cuba to emigrate, Louisiana served as a refuge for those escaping the Haitian Revolution, 
continuing the pattern of French refugees seeking help in Louisiana.     
Louisiana’s history of immigrants, free and slave, arriving from Europe, Africa, and the 
Caribbean resulted in an unusually complex society, a fact Claiborne addressed early in his 
administration.  A mere six weeks after assuming control of Louisiana, Claiborne observed in a 
letter to Secretary of State Madison that “the materials for a mob are abundant, and it requires all 
my vigilance to prevent disorders.”  Especially taxing to Claiborne were “American, French and 
Spanish Sailors, among whom there exist[ed] no cordiality…whose jealousies and resentments 
might easily be excited.”62  Claiborne pondered the task of finding a way to unite the splintered 
factions lest one gain the upper hand or weaken the territory’s ability to suppress foreign designs 
or a potential slave insurrection.  He wanted Louisiana to avoid the fate of Saint Domingue, 
where slaves had capitalized on the struggle between the opposing whites and free people of 
color.  The free people of color, the one group he failed to note in this correspondence with 
Madison, gave him much cause for concern as well.  
 Claiborne often voiced his unease over the free people of color in New Orleans.  The city 
possessed a large free black population, only approached in influence and size by that of 
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Charleston, South Carolina.63  While Charleston County, South Carolina, contained 16, 011 
whites, 45,385 slaves, and 1,783 free people of color totaling 63,179 inhabitants, the Louisiana 
territorial census of 1806 reported a total population of 52,998, consisting of 23,574 slaves, 
3,355 free people of color, and 26,069 whites.64  The white population included 13,500 “natives 
of Louisiana, for the most part descendants of the French; about 3,500 natives of the United 
States, and the residue Europeans generally, including the native French, Spaniards, English, 
Germans, and Irish.”65  A completely different caste within society, the free people of color 
presented Claiborne with unique challenges as he attempted to establish a stable society.  The 
outcome of the Haitian Revolution, during which slaves and free blacks essentially eliminated 
the white population, remained ever-present in Claiborne’s correspondence.   
In a comparative essay on the three-caste societies of Louisiana and Saint Domingue, 
historian Laura Foner discusses the uniqueness of racial lines in the British and French West 
Indies.  Unlike in most regions of the United States, which denied social status to any non-white 
person, free blacks in the West Indies possessed the ability to claim a measure of status within 
the larger social system.  The dissimilarities between American and French slave societies 
hinged upon manumission.  While Americans preferred a hard and fast racial line in order to 
maintain control as the ruling society, Frenchmen chose to allow blacks to purchase their own 
freedom and enter into a third social caste between enslaved and total freedom.  Louisiana’s 
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French social legacy, predicated upon the existence of a three-caste society, gave Claiborne a 
unique challenge when he assumed the governor-generalship in 1803.66 
 Hoping to avoid major tension, Claiborne constantly sought to balance all three castes—
whites, free people of color, and slaves.  On July 12, 1804, he alerted Madison to a situation in 
the city wherein a white printer received a letter from a free person of color.  The letter, meant to 
be distributed throughout the city, called for a meeting of the free people of color to discuss 
matters arising out of the American takeover of New Orleans.  Whites immediately grew 
concerned at the prospect of a mass meeting and tensions rose.  Claiborne worked quickly to 
prevent conflict, convincing a group of influential leaders within the free black community to 
cancel the meeting.  Choosing not to discipline the letter-writer, Claiborne pointed out “the 
events which had Spread blood and desolation in St. Domingo, originated in a dispute between 
the white and Mulatto inhabitants, and that the too rigid treatment of the former, induced the 
Latter to seek the support & assistance of the Negroes.”67  Throughout his governorship, 
Claiborne remained cognizant of the events that had transpired earlier in Saint Domingue, and he 
sought every possible solution to avoid a similar occurrence in Louisiana. 
 President Jefferson’s policy for the American frontier dictated that Claiborne use militia 
for defense.68  In his correspondence to the secretaries of state and war, the governor complained 
that he had available, on the borders of Louisiana, very few United States soldiers who served to 
keep the Spanish forces in Texas and West Florida in check.  Attempting to organize an effective 
militia in a diverse territory, Claiborne struggled to form a cohesive unit to defend against 
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potential threats in New Orleans because of the difficulty of maintaining order among the high 
concentration of slaves.  To do so, he often sought balance.       
The Spanish tradition of arming the free people of color for militia duty unsettled the 
“ancient” French Creoles.  Further, the Spanish had relied on free blacks in the militia during 
their colonial rule, a fact that caused an unusual predicament for Claiborne.  Under Spanish 
colonial rule the free militia had remained unpopular, but Spanish custom and practice forced it 
upon Claiborne.  Concerned, he wrote Secretary of War Henry Dearborn about “a great dislike 
between the white Natives of Louisiana, and the free men of colour.”69  He desired a strong 
militia but feared the potential consequences of armed, free blacks.  Claiborne cautiously 
expressed his concern that “to re-commission [the free people of color] might be considered as 
an outrage on the feelings of a part of the Nation, and as opposed to those principles of Policy 
which the Safety of the Southern States has necessarily established.”70  On the other hand, 
frightened that disbanding the free black militia would simply release armed and disgruntled 
people of color into society, he hoped to protect the free people of color’s place in the militia.  In 
an effort to maintain stability, Claiborne chose to maintain the system in place when he assumed 
control.  While the militia problem challenged him, Claiborne’s determination and careful 
planning helped to form the force that quelled the rebellion in January, 1811.   
In addition to the free people of color, Claiborne received challenges from the multi-
ethnic white population in New Orleans.  From the outset, Claiborne mulled over the options and 
obstacles in front of him.  United States Adjutant General Henry Hopkins informed Claiborne 
that diversity challenged his ability to create an effective militia force.  He blamed the “native 
Americans, native Louisianians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Englishmen, Germans, Italians &c 
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&c…[because] their manners are discordant as their Language, and their prejudices are often as 
various, as the Governments and Laws of t Country which gave them Birth.”71  Frustrated over 
the communication barrier, Claiborne exclaimed, “Not one in fifty of the old inhabitants appear 
to me to understand the English Language.”72  Ignorance of the English language posed 
significant problems as he worked to form a government, and confronted him when he attempted 
to form an effective militia force to patrol the city and surrounding countryside.   
The first carnival after the American takeover made evident the deep-seated divisions 
inherent in the city.   Writing Madison, Claiborne stated “It originated in a contest between some 
young Americans and Frenchmen, whether the American or French dances should have a 
preference.”73  Opposing sides drew swords before calmer heads prevailed.  The incident, 
however, confirmed the fundamental ethnic and nationalist differences that challenged Claiborne 
as he worked to unify the territory.  At all times, French Louisianans remained cognizant of their 
French heritage, kept track of events in Europe, celebrated Bastille Day, and encouraged their 
fellow countrymen to seek refuge in Louisiana.74    
 The skeptical French and Spanish inhabitants of Louisiana maintained a sincerely critical 
perception of the American government, forcing Claiborne to labor to gather support.  Claiborne 
warned Madison of “an impression [which] was received in some circles that Louisiana would 
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revert to France, on the conclusion of the present European [Napoleonic] War.”75  Claiborne 
believed that the Louisianans wished to bide their time until this reversion occurred, remaining 
uncommitted to his cause.  To maintain a successful territory and move posthaste toward 
statehood, he needed to prevent further social fissures.  Toward this end he sent a confidential 
agent, Doctor John Watkins, to ascertain the mood of the people along the Mississippi River 
between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, and to rally support for the American government.76   
 Visiting with long-time residents and reporting on the conditions he found, Watkins 
canvassed the region assigned him.  Talking with French and Spanish settlers, Watkins assured 
them of the American government’s policies and intentions in the region.  Watkins “impress[ed] 
upon their minds high and honourable ideas of the American Government,” promising them that 
“their liberty, property and religion would be protected.”77  Although he failed to convince them 
entirely, Watkins successfully refuted any notion that Louisiana would ever revert to French 
control.  At the end of his visit, Claiborne’s emissary declared himself “fully persuaded that a 
large majority of the most respectable people of the Country, are better satisfied with their 
present situations,” and would support the American government in the years ahead.78 
Claiborne worried that one of the splintered factions might use the free people of color to 
their advantage.  Manipulating the mullatoes, as Claiborne referred to the free people of color in 
the territory, the Spanish might be able to drive the wedge between the French Creoles and 
Americans even deeper.  Claiborne assumed such a division would provide Spain with the 
opportunity to reassert itself in the territory.  From the beginning, Claiborne wrestled with the 
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Spanish administrators in New Orleans when, after the transfer to American ownership, they 
failed to promptly withdraw their soldiers from the territory.  Once the remaining remnants of the 
Spanish military left Louisiana, they still continued to occupy the area just to the west of 
American territory, maintaining a threatening position in the eyes of territorial commandants on 
the borders including Edward Turner in Natchitoches, 250 miles northwest of New Orleans on 
the frontier facing Spanish territory.  Surrounded by Spanish West Florida and Spanish Texas, 
Claiborne realized he had to act with calculated shrewdness to maintain control in Louisiana.   
Reports surfaced that the Marquis de Casa Calvo in West Florida, possessed a decree 
promising that any slave who fled into Spanish territory would be given protection by the 
Crown.79  The Marquis denied the reports in letters to Claiborne, citing his belief that the whole 
situation had been “some mistaken intelligence or some very awkward error [that] must have 
happened, on the part of that Commandant [Turner]”80 in Natchitoches.  No evidence has come 
to light that the decree actually existed, but the perception that the Spanish wished to weaken 
American authority in the territory remained very real to Americans in Louisiana.   
 One concern manifested itself in 1806 when word spread that a priest had plotted to incite 
racial conflict.  Whites in New Orleans feared that Father Antoine, whom the Spanish authorities 
sent away during their rule, attempted to create instability.  No evidence exists to suggest that his 
plan received official endorsement from Spain; however, Americans feared that by capitalizing 
on the resulting instability the Spanish forces on the borders of the Louisiana Territory would 
regain control of New Orleans and surrounding area, without official sanction from Spain.  
Spanish territorial officials in West Florida and Texas denied Claiborne’s allegations that they 
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plotted to retake Louisiana.  Claiborne informed the secretary of war that Father Antoine was “by 
some citizens esteemed an accomplished hypocrite, has some great influence with the people of 
color and, report says, embraces every opportunity to render them discontented under the 
American government.”81  When the Spanish priest denied the allegations, Governor Claiborne 
required that he declare an oath of allegiance, and placed the priest under constant observation. 
Claiborne remained justifiably suspicious throughout his administration, warning 
Commandant Turner in Natchitoches that the Spanish “have been very busy in circulating 
reports, that the Americans are mere Hogs, that they do not live like Christians… and that they 
make use of the meanest and most despicable means to sour the dispositions towards, and 
alienate the affections of the people of Louisiana.”82  Whether or not Spanish officials outside of 
Louisiana’s borders actually sought to sway the planters one way or another against the United 
States, the fear of such a conspiracy remained preeminent among American officials until after 
the War of 1812 and the Battle of New Orleans.83  Claiborne took the rumors very seriously, 
going so far as to suggest that “attempts had been made and will be made by the Partizans of 
Spain to alienate the affections of Louisianians from the American Government.”84  When the 
slaves did revolt in 1811 and marched toward New Orleans, General Wade Hampton himself 
blamed the Spanish for inciting the insurrection but his sentiments proved unfounded.85  
Although false, Hampton’s accusation illustrates how seriously the administration viewed 
Spanish intentions.    
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Many Creole planters became disenchanted by American rule and concerned about the 
influx of Americans into the territory.  They worried that the new American government would 
threaten their social and economic status.  Particularly frustrating for Creole planters, Claiborne’s 
administration disallowed credit that Frenchmen had been granted by lenders under colonial rule.  
Additionally, as per American custom, the federal government planned to sell vacant territorial 
lands as a source of revenue.  Jean Noel Destrehan, speaker of the House of Representatives in 
Louisiana, argued for the reinstatement of French and Spanish customs.  He exclaimed that the 
previous colonial powers distributed lands for free “as a means of increasing the population of 
the country, encouraging its agriculture, and gaining the effects of its inhabitants.”86   
One month after assuming control of the territory, Claiborne alerted Madison to incessant 
French Creole attempts to foment a schism between themselves and the Americans in Louisiana.  
The French Creoles continued to exhibit a significant partiality for France, in their language, 
manners and habits.  Claiborne planned to inform the Creoles how the American government 
operated in hopes of dispelling their fears that their rights would be cast aside and ignored under 
the new administration.87  During his first year in office, Claiborne worked to introduce 
American governmental customs while continuing to respect the system that existed when he 
arrived.  He strove to cultivate trust and commitment among the French citizens by teaching 
them about the American system.  Incessant and unforeseen challenges, including the arrival of 
many refugees from Saint Domingue, threatened to strengthen French sentiments, causing 
Claiborne significant concern. 
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Laussat, the French diplomat who oversaw the transition of Louisiana to the United 
States compared the habits and customs of his fellow countrymen to the newly-arrived 
Americans.  He spoke uneasily about the Americans who “introduced the strictness of their laws 
and exactness of their customs.”  Laussat remained concerned specifically over the enforcement 
of debt under American control.  Traditionally the French Creoles incurred debts under vague 
terms lacking any strict enforcement for settlement while Americans typically borrowed money 
on predestined terms for repayment.88     
 Fearing that the transf of power would lead to their displacement from the socio-
economic elite, the Creoles needed reassurance from Claiborne.  In July 1804, he suggested that 
some of the difficulty in gaining the loyalties of the older Louisianans stemmed from “a 
considerable jealousy of their American Brothers, viewing themselves as a distinct and acquired 
Branch of our Family, they seem to think they are not Secure in the affections and confidence of 
the government of this circumstances also, designing men Avail themselves to excite fear and 
suspicion.”89  The outcome of the battle and the actions of the American government saving the 
city from British invaders assured the inhabitants of American intentions.90  The United States’ 
commitment to prevent the city from being taken showed the Creoles that the American 
government possessed the ability to protect its citizens from foreign invaders, and thus 1815 
became a major turning point toward unity in Louisiana.   
Examining the slave revolt on Saint Domingue provides a clue to the ideological spark 
that helped to cause the 1811 revolt in Louisiana.  The ideology that led to the rebellion arrived 
in Louisiana from France via Saint Domingue.  From the outset of the French Revolution, the 
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ideals of the French Enlightenment spread throughout the French colonial world.  Slaves and free 
men adapted French ideas of liberty to their own environment.  Political philosopher Susan 
Buck-Morss suggests “the black Jacobins of Saint Domingue surpassed the metropole in actively 
realizing the Enlightenment goal of human liberty, seeming to give proof that the French 
Revolution was not simply a European phenomenon, but world-historical in its implications.”91  
The Haitian Revolution was a manifestation of the French Enlightenment as interpreted by 
people of color in Saint Domingue.  While they fled the violence of revolution, refugees, white 
and black, still possessed these ideals and a willingness to act upon them, bringing them to 
Louisiana where the environment proved fertile for further cultivation of revolutionary ideology.   
 Susan Buck-Morss further argues that “slavery became a problematic source of labor 
during the Enlightenment at a time when great thinkers argued that freedom existed as the 
‘highest and universal political value.’”92  The antithesis of Enlightenment ideology, slavery 
challenged the Frenchmen who had sought to overthrow oppressors denying their natural and 
inalienable rights during the French Revolution while remaining slaveholding societies.  The 
slaves, and free people of color who maintained partial rights, absorbed the revolutionary 
ideology and the language of the French Enlightenment.  These dangerous ideals became reality 
on the island of Saint Domingue when hundreds of thousands of free and enslaved blacks 
revolted, motivated by the same rhetoric found in France.93 
 Just as French Enlightenment ideology began circulating throughout the Atlantic World, 
parts of the Western World embraced the Industrial Revolution.  Influenced by industrial 
developments, sugar production on Saint Domingue became even more exploitative of slaves 
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due to the higher demand for raw materials. 94  Mortality rates remained high during the colonial 
period because the slave trade ensured a plentiful supply of fresh African slaves.95  Although 
generally mortality rates remained catastrophic throughout the eighteenth century, Lester 
Langley argues that slaves on Saint Domingue experienced a less harsh form of slavery than 
those living in the British West Indies.  Guaranteed a certain degree of care under the Code Noir 
(Black Codes,) the enslaved population possessed certain rights that slaves under British rule 
failed to obtain.96  The Code Noir, guaranteeing certain rights, gave slaves a glimpse of freedom.  
Seemingly impossible to grasp under excessive oppression, slaves in the British West Indies had 
no sense of freedom.  Langley argues that the hope of liberty, instilled in the slaves of French 
Saint Domingue by a less harsh slave regime, in addition to French Enlightenment ideology, 
caused the slaves in Saint Domingue to seek their Jubilee in a bid for freedom.97 
 The three-caste social system in Saint Domingue, similar to that of Louisiana, challenged 
the French Colonial leaders on the island.  Approximately 28,000 to 37,000 free people of color 
and 30,000 to 40,000 whites controlled the island while as many as 500,000 slaves worked the 
plantations.98  Under this system, society split more along class lines rather than race.  The racial 
composition of Saint Domingue’s population remained tremendously unbalanced as a select few 
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masters managed a great many slaves on vast tracts of land.99  Even in relation to the free people 
on Saint Domingue, whites still found themselves in the numerical minority.    
Racial control heightened and tolerance decreased significantly when Saint Domingue 
began to experience greater economic success through a boom in sugar production.  When sugar 
production mechanized, masters began pushing their slaves even harder, heightening racial 
control.  The free people of color especially, found themselves placed under increasing 
restrictions as whites increasingly feared the freedoms enjoyed by free blacks.100  By 1788, 
French law required free people of color to obtain a permit for any trade except farming.  
Although free blacks lacked full citizenship, they still possessed the right to own and cultivate 
land.  The double standard of partial citizenship frustrated the free blacks on Saint Domingue to 
the point of rebellion in 1791.101  Even as racial boundaries solidified, whites divided against one 
another, much as they did in Louisiana.  Sugar planters clashed with coffee planters, and both 
clashed with merchants and businessmen in urban areas.  Typically disagreements arose over 
their social status.102 
 The social upheaval of the French Revolution deeply affected Saint Domingue and, in 
turn, Louisiana.  Many of the colonists on the island wished to avoid the turmoil in France, but 
its revolutionary ideology spread to the island despite their efforts.  The grand blancs, described 
by Thomas Ott as “socially and economically resembling affluent Spanish American creoles, 
[who] were the planters, great merchants, and wealthy maritime agents,” drafted a proposal to 
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gain greater political independence during the revolution in France.103  Acting thus, they could 
hardly shield themselves, their slaves, or the free people of color from news of the revolution and 
the spirit embedded in its ideology.   
 Twenty years before the eventual revolt on American soil, Saint Domingue erupted in 
revolution.  Rebelling against the uneven power structure, the free people of color hoped to 
assert their natural rights that they perceived to be guaranteed by the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man.  The armed free people of color marched against Le Cap on the northern coast of Saint 
Domingue capturing and executing governmental officials.  After this show of force the 
Constituent Assembly in France granted them political equality.104  Vincent Ogé, a wealthy free 
man of color, led this revolt following a trip to Paris where he witnessed the promulgation of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the efforts of Frenchmen to assert their natural rights.  He, 
like those around him who had traveled to France, taught others in Saint Domingue about the 
ideology of the French Enlightenment, seeking to obtain full political freedom for his fellow 
freed people on the island.105 
 An ambiguous ruling passed by the French Constituent Assembly, thought to give free 
people of color full citizenship, still forbade their right to vote.  Responding, free blacks across 
parts of Saint Domingue began making plans to wage a full-scale civil war against the whites.  
As an unforeseen and unsolicited result, the slaves revolted, seeking to capitalize on the already 
volatile environment.  The primary leader of the slave revolt, Boukman Dutty, who worked as an 
overseer on a plantation, understood the hostility between whites and the free people of color.  
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He saw the tension between the French planters and the free people of color as an opportunity to 
be exploited.  Intent on expelling the whites from the island, Dutty led a small-scale revolt 22 
August 1791, which gathered force with each plantation it visited as slaves voted with their feet 
and hands, trampling and exterminating their masters, while advancing toward the coast.106  
Within a year the rebellion spread to all parts of the island.  Completely losing control of the 
island, the legislature in France granted all free people civic equality regardless of color on 4 
April, 1792, sending Léger-Félicité Sonthaonax to lead a commission to ensure that colonial 
authorities complied with the ruling.  The declaration of equality excluded enslaved Africans, 
however, and fighting continued until 1804 because the slaves saw their opportunity to 
capitalize, hoping to obtain their own independence as well.107   
 The slaves on Saint Domingue moved to strike a blow for their own freedom when their 
masters refused to abide by the natural laws of liberty that they themselves preached.  Enslaved 
Africans forced their masters to recognize natural rights and abolish slavery, completing the only 
successful slave rebellion in world history.108  Not long after, slaves on the German Coast in 
Louisiana attempted the same feat.  As Susan Buck-Morss points out, “The Haitian Revolution 
was the crucible, the trial by fire for the ideals of the French Enlightenment,” and all of the 
Western World watched and waited to see the result.109  The outcome had an immense impact, 
both positive and negative on Louisiana as ideology, innovative sugar technology, and the people 
to implement both flowed into the territory seeking refuge from that trial.   
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CHAPTER 4 
“AN ENCREASE OF POPULATION, WHICH MAY RETARD THE GROWTH OF TRUE 
AMERICAN PRINCIPLES” 
 
 
William Charles Cole Claiborne faced situations that remained literally beyond his 
control.  He understood the complexity of his task as he attempted to unify a society composed 
of three social castes, one of which, the whites, remained itself split.110  The territory’s complex 
history, in conjunction with the variety of peoples in Louisiana, challenged Claiborne daily.  
Further, facing various waves of people entering the territory, he voiced his frustrations to the 
mayor that “the Intrigues of certain late Emigrants from France and some of the Satellites of the 
Spanish Government, have tended considerably to heighten the Discontent in this Quarter.”111  
Each non-American immigrant strengthened and reasserted the differences of those living in 
Louisiana, immensely challenging Claiborne.  While frustrating, the challenges of Claiborne’s 
early tenure failed to provide the spark to ignite a disaster, such as slave insurrection, that would 
truly threaten the safety of the territory.  
Increasingly Claiborne confronted mounting challenges to the stability of Louisiana 
which created an environment favorable to slave revolt.  In addition to Claiborne’s efforts to 
balance disjointed social factions, discussed in the previous chapter, he also contended with an 
ancient and covert opponent, the swamps surrounding Lake Ponchartrain.  Vincent Nolte, a 
merchant at the turn of the nineteenth century, described the area as “innumerable creeks called 
bayous, that communicate by manifold little branches, with each other… [that promoted] 
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clandestine traffic.”112  Louisiana’s geography included uninhabited and unexplored swamps and 
marshes that provided cover for slaves escaping their masters and fostered covert activity 
amongst both runaway and plantation-bound slaves.  Maroon communities thrived in the swamps 
thought by many to be uninhabitable.     
Maroon communities provided slaves with a unique outlet for resistance against the 
oppressive slaveholding regime.  Although not physically harming their masters, escaped slaves 
withheld their bodies from labor and assumed responsibility for their own physical well-being.  
Herbert Aptheker became one of the first historians to overturn earlier scholarship that had 
portrayed slaves as contented workers on plantations run by benevolent masters.  He studied 
various forms of resistance and argued that maroon communities affected slave societies both 
passively and actively when “they offered havens, served as bases for marauding expeditions 
against nearby plantations and, at times, supplied the nucleus for the leadership of planned 
uprisings.”113 Aptheker failed to understand slaves on a unique level, continuing the historical 
tradition of treating the slaves as the objects by looking at them through their masters.  Eugene 
Genovese became one of the first historians to treat enslaved Africans as free-willed entities who 
maintained their own characteristics outside of the master’s influence, even touching on maroon 
communities in his search for the origins of black nationalism.114  Escaped slaves actively 
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participated in maroon communities throughout the Caribbean and American South, particularly 
Louisiana.   
 Maroons served as a nucleus for the leadership of potential slave insurrections.  Having 
already proven their desire and adeptness to escape their masters, some runaways with leadership 
qualities asserted their authority among the maroons as leaders.  They formed a cohesive and 
somewhat organized mass out of a scattered group who generally sought self-preservation first 
and foremost.  Alvin O. Thompson closely examines the maroon communities in the Caribbean, 
devoting much space to a discussion of the ways in which maroon communities influenced the 
Haitian Revolution.  He argues that whites and free people of color began their struggle to obtain 
more power from the ruling elite in France, but “it was the enslaved people, now transformed 
into insurgents, along with the Maroons who moved the struggle into its independence phase and 
created a revolution in the former colony.”115  Essentially, the maroons aided in providing the 
knockout blow whereby the black population as a whole could grab freedom on Saint Domingue.  
The maroon communities in Saint Domingue lay on the frontier between two competing 
European colonial powers, Spain and France, and they “were able to exploit the political 
antipathy of the neighboring powers to their own advantage.”116  Because maroon communities 
in the Caribbean grew so large while the number of whites remained so few, the covert 
communities often assumed political status and, at times, negotiated treaties of peace or amnesty 
with local colonial authorities.  Because of the extreme demographic imbalance, colonial powers 
typically chose to negotiate with the maroon communities instead of combating them.  Thus, 
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whites curbed the harassment from maroons and preserved life while independent maroon 
communities guaranteed their stability.117   
Maroon communities in the Caribbean differed from those in the United States because 
of the demographic discrepancy.  Throughout the Caribbean maroons attained a political status, 
becoming independent entities that forced white recognition.  Although lacking the explicit 
political existence of their counterparts in the West Indies, maroons in Louisiana still maintained 
a desire to practice political ideology and participate in the political debate.  Americans and 
Creoles in Louisiana possessed sufficient numerical superiority that they did not have to 
negotiate with the outlaw slaves.  Although less politicized than maroon communities in the 
Caribbean, slaves hiding in the Louisiana swamps around New Orleans threatened the safety and 
viability of the white population nonetheless.118  At their very core, maroons endangered the 
white establishment because they lay outside of its strict racial control.  Declaring their bodies 
independent and organizing in communities allowed maroons to withdraw from the traditional 
white-black relationship that characterized southern society.119   
Historians Stephanie Camp, David Cecelski and Thomas Buchanan discuss the role of 
geography in aiding runaway slaves, specifically those creating a maroon society, as they 
threatened to weaken the white power structure when they took control of their own actions.120  
Stephanie Camp ascribed to the argument that Aptheker founded in terms of the important role 
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passive resistance played throughout the antebellum South.  She expands the terminology of 
resistance, giving the slaves credit for the world they carved out in the face of the strict 
plantation system and devoting a great deal of time to studying runaways.  She argues that 
maroons wrested their bodies from the control of their masters and created an independent space, 
free from dominance.  David Cecelski’s examination of maritime North Carolina lends itself to 
the study of Louisiana because the geographies and climates.  Additionally, the tradition of 
maroon communities, mirrors one another.  Thomas Buchanan’s study focuses more on the 
underground networks of information along the waterways of New Orleans than it does maroon 
communities.  Studying the boat workers along the Mississippi River during the nineteenth 
century, Buchanan discovered an ingenious system for communication and trade among slaves 
living under incredible subjection.  Difficult to observe from Claiborne’s point of view because 
of the dense terrain they inhabited, maroon communities’ very existence presented problems 
because they inspired potential participation in plots amongst Louisiana slaves along 
underground networks, made easier by the cover of Louisiana swamps.121     
Maroons in Louisiana challenged Claiborne’s ability to govern the territory and progress 
quickly toward statehood.  With few soldiers at their disposal, local American officials often 
relied on impromptu patrols or militia excursions to weaken the maroon camps.  Claiborne never 
possessed the strength and opportunity to concentrate his military to mount a formidable assault 
on the maroon camps and the bulk of his correspondence focuses on other matters, not generally 
addressing the maroons directly in his policies.  The diverse challenges facing the governor 
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prevented him from concentrating the military power he possessed against one point for too long.  
Richard Price, wrote a story that appeared in the New York Evening Post in “November 1827 
[concerning] a Negro woman returned to her master in New Orleans after an absence of sixteen 
years.  She told of a maroon settlement some eight miles north of the city containing about sixty 
people.”122  Coincidentally the woman had been absent from her master since 1811, the year of 
the rebellion in St. John the Baptist Parish.            
 Whether or not Louisianan maroons possessed a clear understanding of the internal and 
external political tensions between Creoles and Americans or Louisianans and Spaniards remains 
difficult to ascertain.  The outlaw communities benefited from conflict between the disjointed 
factions due to the resulting power vacuum and the many obstacles facing Claiborne early in his 
governorship.123  His preoccupation with the Spanish in West Florida and Texas coupled with his 
efforts to address internal division between Americans and Creoles forced him to concentrate the 
bulk of his military elsewhere.  While the maroons of Louisiana remained depoliticized, they 
continued to present a covert challenge to territorial safety and remained a nuisance for many 
years.  Originally, the maroon communities threatened Louisianans but lacked the ideological 
threat necessary for an aggressive slave insurrection.  But that spur arrived with the final wave of 
immigration of Haitian refugees in the summer of 1809.   
 Examining Louisiana in the context of the wider Caribbean world allows for better 
interpretation of the Creole tradition and the revolutionary ideology present in the territory that 
helped make Louisiana an American anomaly.  The geography of Louisiana, consisting of vast 
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water networks that enabled travel, commerce, and communication, coupled with the history of 
colonial rule, placed the territory in the historical context of the Caribbean.124   A fledgling city 
on the southwestern frontier of the United States, New Orleans owed its status as a major port to 
favorable geography.125  Foreign goods, ideology, and knowledge flowed through the gateway of 
New Orleans into the rest of the territory.  For Claiborne, New Orleans’s status as a major port 
served as both a blessing and a curse.  He benefitted from the capital, labor, and innovative 
methods for agricultural production flowing into and out of the port while confronting the 
importation of radical, dangerous ideology.   
Historically, Frenchmen moved back and forth between Louisiana and Saint Domingue.  
When the Haitian Revolution tore the island asunder, some refugees sought help from family 
members in Louisiana.  Referring to the transfer of knowledge, revolutionary ideology, and 
people to Louisiana, Adam Rothman suggests that “events in the French Caribbean colony of 
Saint Domingue initiated a qualitative transformation in Louisiana’s development.”126  Some 
refugees from the island brought with them a revolutionary ideology that provided the spark for 
rebellion in a territory that had slowly become an ideal breeding ground for racial violence over 
the course of its history.   
Upon becoming governor, Claiborne initially fought emigration from Saint Domingue 
because he feared the possibly disharmonious result of allowing refugees of the Haitian 
Revolution into Louisiana without first examining their character.  Four months after assuming 
office, he cautioned that the immigrants arriving from the West Indies “might interrupt the peace 
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of our Society… [and that] some of these Emigrants are doubtless worthy men but I fear a 
majority of them will be useless, if not bad citizens.”127  Claiborne diligently worked to 
encourage harmony between Americans and Creoles and the “re-creolization” threatened his 
initial gains.  Despite Louisiana’s shared Creole heritage with Saint Domingue, Claiborne’s 
administration attempted to distance itself from the émigrés and their slaves.  He wanted very 
much for the Americans to begin asserting themselves in Louisiana both demographically and 
politically.  By becoming more evenly matched demographically, Americans could more easily 
manage the transition to their own system of governance from the old Creole Louisiana 
traditions.  The Moniteur de Louisiana, edited by émigrés from the Haitian Revolution and 
printing articles directed toward the emigrants of Saint Domingue, fueled the detachment 
between French Creoles in the territory and the Americans in the territory.  
Although some of the immigrants arrived as “unprincipled penniless men,” many brought 
resources, knowledge, and skilled labor. 128  Particularly influential, the French émigrés and their 
slaves arriving in Louisiana, carried with them better methods for sugar production.  Prior to its 
revolution, Saint Domingue led the world in sugar production.  Himself a refugee of the island, 
Pierre-Louis Berquin-Duvallon documented his travels through the Louisiana Territory 
observing the state of agriculture.  He attributed the early success of the Louisiana sugar 
industry, a mere eight years old during his visit to “the calamities of St. Domingo, which raised 
the demand for sugar from Louisiana, and sent many of the planters and workmen of that 
unhappy island to seek a settlement on the Mississippi.”129  Before long, Claiborne noted that 
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many of the immigrants contributed to the “development of educational facilities, newspapers, 
and theatres; and distinguished themselves in government, law, literature, drama, and agriculture 
in the territory.”130  While these contributions benefited the territory, the immigrants created 
social tensions that became manifest after the 1809 migration. 
The greatest threat to Claiborne’s ability to maintain control and development in 
Louisiana surfaced in 1809.  Spanish authorities in Cuba granted French exiles asylum following 
the Haitian Revolution beginning in 1791, but when Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, placing 
his brother Joseph on the throne, Cuban Spaniards reacted bitterly, and understandably, by 
demanding that all French citizens leave Spanish Cuba.131  The refugees had few options 
available to them when they found themselves exiled from Cuba, and many turned to Louisiana 
for help.132  Eighteen months before the 1811 revolt, thousands of refugees who had first fled to 
Cuba to escape the Haitian Revolution, flowed into Louisiana and contributed the final missing 
piece for slave insurrection.   
After 1803, Americans poured into Louisiana tipping the scales away from Creole 
domination in the territory.  As the population balance shifted, Americans gained greater 
influence politically and socially.  The increasing balance between Americans and Creoles 
helped Claiborne to introduce gradually American laws, social customs, and government 
policies.  When the immigrants arrived from Cuba, however, they “re-creolize[d] a creole city 
that has been described as ‘perhaps the most seething ethnic melting pot that the nineteenth-
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century world could produce.’”133  In a private letter to President Jefferson, Claiborne expressed 
his concern over new challenges to Louisiana’s stability and prosperity, claiming “that the 
misfortunes of Spain and her Colonies will give to this Territory an encrease of population, 
which may retard the growth of the true American Principles.”134  As a result, the American 
population in New Orleans and surrounding countryside failed to surpass the Creole population 
until the 1830s  
With the major influx of people, both enslaved and free from Cuba in 1809 New Orleans 
experienced population growth unlike it had seen in its ninety year existence.  Writing during the 
early phases of migration, Claiborne informed Secretary of State Robert Smith that he expected 
approximately 7,500 refugees.  He proclaimed that “these unfortunate people are for the most 
part without resources, and must depend upon the Benevolence of this society for the means of 
present support.”135  The refugees placed a strain on housing and resources in the territory as the 
population grew exponentially in a matter of months.  While most Louisianans supported the 
decision to allow the refugees to stay, some citizens demanded that governmental officials halt 
further immigration from Cuba.136  
 Writing to William Savage, commercial agent for the United States in Jamaica, Claiborne 
suggested that the Cuban refugees find asylum elsewhere because of the burden they placed on 
Louisiana.  He worried that those who had already arrived in Louisiana were “so numerous as to 
be embarrassing to our own Citizens,” and that “house Rent and Provisions are extravagantly 
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high, families of limited resources find them soon exhausted, and the number of poor and 
distressed are daily augmenting.”  Claiborne feared that the immigrants would soon dominate his 
attention and policy making, and thus render him unable to protect Louisiana from potential 
unrest including slave insurrections.137  
 Claiborne stressed that “motives of humanity induced [him] to receive the women and 
children,” and that Louisiana possessed, at that time, “a much greater proportion of [slaves] than 
comports with our interests.”138  Two days later the governor wrote Smith concerning the 
refugees, particularly their slaves.  He explained that “motives of humanity induced [him] to 
permit the Refugees from Cuba to land their slaves, but this indulgence [could not] be extended 
much farther.”139  Claiborne, clearly unsettled over the shifting racial balance as the enslaved 
population and free people of color together began to outnumber the whites in Louisiana, hoped 
to limit the arrival of slaves.   
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countryside.  Evenly split among the three factions, all three groups received a boost in their 
population, challenging the American authority within the territory.     
 While white immigrants arriving in Louisiana tested American authority in the territory, 
the slaves and free people of color arriving from Cuba threatened much more.  Claiborne feared 
they carried the rhetoric of the Haitian Revolution, the desire to implement it in Louisiana, and 
that they would act on it if they saw the opportunity.  Whites, slaves, and free blacks had 
coexisted in Louisiana for generations, but tensions had never resulted in widespread violence.  
Resident Louisianans worried that the newly-arrived free people of color and slaves possessed 
thoughts, instilled in them by the Haitian Revolution, of overthrowing their own masters if they 
saw an opportunity.   
Claiborne diligently attempted to limit the importation of these elements from the 
Caribbean, informing Mayor Etienne de Boré of his plan to regulate the arrival of people in New 
Orleans “with the view of remedying the evils to be apprehended from the improper introduction 
of Slaves and other people of Colour from the Islands.”  Claiborne wanted to determine whether 
or not the slaves and free blacks possessed any revolutionary proclivities and whether or not they 
had participated in the revolution on Saint Domingue.  He wished to prohibit them from landing 
in Louisiana “until they obtained [his] permission to ascend the River.”141  Claiborne directed 
Captain Nicoll, Commanding at Plaquemines to assume responsibility for examining those who 
wished to enter Louisiana, attempting to determine their suitability and the trustworthiness of 
their character.142   
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The free people of color presented a sinister challenge for whites who desired to maintain 
racial control and stability.  When free black immigrants arrived in Louisiana, they boosted the 
already-significant population in the territory.  Their growing numbers did not increase social 
stability.  Traditionally, free blacks occupied a higher status in Louisiana and Saint Domingue 
than in other areas of the American South.  The free black population of New Orleans “possessed 
land and wealth in amounts and numbers well beyond the reach of any other black population in 
the United States.”143  Making New Orleans unique, the influential free people of color created a 
separate social faction within the city and provided African Americans with unique access to 
certain benefits, including property ownership, freely intermingling with whites, and appearing 
openly in the streets of the city.  Land and wealth provided free people of color with the 
opportunity to create a niche in society wherein they could test the boundaries of racial 
discrimination.  While they remained free legally, whites attempted to limit that freedom because 
they feared the breakdown of racial control. Patricia Brady at the Historic New Orleans 
Collection suggests that “because of the French and the Spanish background, the free people of 
color [in New Orleans] had almost the same rights as whites.”144 
Six years after the transfer of power into American hands, New Orleans’s francophone 
Creole and black population increased significantly following the immigration from Cuba.145  
From 1803-1811, the free African-American population nearly tripled in Louisiana, increasing 
from 1,335 to approximately 5,000, with 3,000 of the newly-arrived free blacks immigrating 
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between 1809 and 1810 alone.146  The increasing free population threatened racial stability 
because it shifted the racial balance in the territory toward blacks.  Finding themselves 
outnumbered and fearing for their safety, many inhabitants, both American and Creole worried 
that the free people of color cultivated a revolutionary ideology, seeking to challenge the racial 
boundaries as they had on Saint Domingue.147   
 In a letter to President Jefferson, Claiborne stated that “the number of free mulattoes [free 
people of color] is also considerable; on the change of Government, it is not impossible, but 
these people may be disposed to be riotous, and the organizing and arming the white 
Inhabitants,” into a more effective militia force.148  Claiborne believed that by increasing the 
number of armed whites in the territory and maintaining the militia he could prevent potential 
social fissures from developing between free people of color and whites.  The fear that free 
blacks might foment civic unrest created overwhelming challenges, but no solidified plans 
surfaced.   
 As free people of color poured into the Louisiana, the territorial legislature sought to 
enact firearms restrictions.  The territorial legislature, perhaps rightfully, believed the Haitian 
Revolution resulted directly from the freedoms that the free people of color enjoyed in Saint 
Domingue.  Members of the legislature began to push for the “banning of free men from carrying 
guns and the authorization of slaves to testify against free men, [thus the] differences in social 
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status between slaves and free men narrowed.”149  Hoping to establish simultaneously a more 
concrete system of racial control while maintaining the distinct third social caste, white 
Louisianans walked a fine line between diminishing the gap dividing the free and servile black 
population and maintaining the barrier between the two groups in order to prevent full-blown 
alliances.  
Despite their free status, free people of color still lacked certain liberties that whites 
around them possessed.  In 1808 the New Orleans City Council learned that a free black man had 
been teaching fencing lessons to other men of color, and on its recommendation, the mayor 
prohibited the lessons from proceeding further.  White Louisianans’ feared that “’mullatoes have 
the insolence to challenge whites to a duel,’” and feared the “’very dangerous consequences’” 
should the fencing lessons continue.150  The thought of free people of color bearing arms 
frightened white Louisianans, and local laws generally prohibited freemen from carrying 
weapons under any conditions.   
Free people of color in Louisiana could move much more freely than could slaves.  
Slaves occasionally left the plantation to fulfill their master’s lease to another planter or to 
complete other tasks, but they did so under strict guidelines.  Requiring their slaves to carry 
passes that regulated their movements, planters and local authorities strictly enforced limitations 
on the hours that a slave could work off of the plantation.  The fluid movement enjoyed by the 
free people of color particularly threatened whites because historical precedent forbade whites 
from legally regulating their movement.  The possible knowledge passing among free blacks 
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along underground networks greatly frightened white Louisianans.151  In New Orleans, between 
Dumaine and Saint Philip streets, near the French market, lay Café des Refugiés, a European-
style coffeehouse.  Largely patronized by refugees from Saint Domingue, the cafe became a 
forum for the discussion and exchange of information among whites and free people of color, 
providing a space of interracial contact.152     
Free black populations in cities throughout the American South preferred to separate 
themselves from the slaves.  Ira Berlin suggests that free people of color understood the necessity 
of attaining acceptance by the slaveholding class. They desired to create schools, churches, and 
other instidutions separate from the enslaved African-Americans around them, seeking to create 
an independent middling class.153  As a result of new restrictive territorial legislation in 
Louisiana, however, many free people of color began to identify with the enslaved population 
along racial lines instead of splitting over the status of freed-enslaved.  Claiborne, on the other 
hand, hoped to curb this trend.  New Orleans’s legacy of free people of color dictated that the 
governor permit the free people of color certain personal liberties including property ownership 
and looser civil restrictions.  Louisianans, as a whole, used the free people of color as “a kind of 
buffer group in a struggle within a divided ruling class,” for two reasons.154  The distinct third 
social caste allowed whites, who remained divided amongst themselves, to ensure a degree of 
friction and tension between free people of color and slaves.  Additionally, the whites hoped to 
maintain the buffer group because doing so made it more difficult for one white faction to gain 
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allegiance from free blacks; essentially they sought to ensure the neutrality of the free people of 
color.  Thus, whites strategically allowed the free people of color certain civil liberties to 
maintain the vital third social caste.   
Even more than the whites and free people of color, slaves from Saint Domingue 
generated the greatest concern among white Louisianans.  While white immigrants posed no 
direct threat for insurrection, they imported the ideology of the French Enlightenment.  
Additionally, whites brought slaves with them who undoubtedly desired their own freedom.  To 
white Louisianans the slaves’ experiences in Saint Domingue, where they witnessed other 
enslaved Africans revolt and slaughter their masters, made them more dangerous than native 
Louisiana slaves.  These slaves either found themselves forced to emigrate from Saint Domingue 
by their masters or chose not to participate in the revolution itself at that time.   
Claiborne tried to implement a system to limit strictly the importation of slaves with 
connections  to Saint Domingue but his efforts ultimately failed.  All incoming ships stopped at 
the Balize at Plaquemine below the river for inspection before proceeding to New Orleans.155  
Claiborne expressed his hope “to prevent the bringing in of Slaves that [had] been concerned in 
the insurrections of St. Domingo.”  The process was difficult to enforce, however, and soon the 
governor exclaimed that “many bad characters will be introduced.  The citizens of Louisiana are 
greatly apprehensive of the West India Negroes but no effectual Stop can at present be put to 
their introduction.”156  Unfortunately for the governor, ship captains often circumvented the 
restrictions either by landing slaves below the Balize and sneaking them into New Orleans by 
                                                 
155 The Balize refers to the entry point where ships entering from the Gulf of Mexico stopped for inspection 
before proceeding to the port of New Orleans.  Over time this simple checkpoint developed into a settlement, known 
during the nineteenth century as Pilottown, Louisiana. 
   
156 W.C.C. Claiborne to James Madison, New Orleans, 12 July 1804, OLB, 2: 245-46. 
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land, passing the Balize under the cover of darkness, or answering questions customs questions 
falsely.157 
Before long, it became clear that Claiborne’s efforts to halt the importation of dangerous 
slaves were as effective as trying to hold back the river itself.158  Dr. Watkins, Claiborne’s 
confidential agent who travelled upriver to ascertain the views of Creoles in the area, recounted a 
story told to him by a planter.  Twelve Africans, allegedly from Saint Domingue, ventured along 
the river threatening whites along their way.  The slaves “spoke of eating human flesh, and in 
general, demonstrated great Savageness of Character, boasting of what they had been and done 
in the horrors of St. Domingo.”  They proved to be the exact element Claiborne hoped to prohibit 
from entering Louisiana.159  Watkins failed to report the outcome of the episode and whether or 
not the local militia apprehended them, but the account did not bode well for local white 
inhabitants.  Clearly the ingredients for white Louisianans’ worst nightmare, a slave uprising, lay 
at their doorstep, and Claiborne seemed helpless to stop it.   
 Constitutionally, the importation of slaves became illegal in the United States after 1808.  
As a result, to allow foreign-born slaves into American territory would present Claiborne’s 
administration with legal problems.  The 1809 immigration pushed the limits of federal law 
when Spain exiled French slaves and their masters.  While the émigrés did not bring their slaves 
with them for the explicit purpose of selling them to American slaveholders, the large-scale 
                                                 
157 W.C.C. Claiborne to Colonel Freeman, New Orleans 17 July 1804, OLB, 2:254; Davis, 48.  William C. 
Davis argues that the Baratarian pirates, headed by Jean Lafitte, benefited from increased illicit smuggling during 
the 1809 immigration.  At the same time, Davis believes Lafitte turned to a more public and honorable form of 
business during the immigration as he focused increasingly on slave trading.   
 
158 W.C.C. Claiborne to officer Commanding at Plaquemines, New Orleans, 16 May 1809, OLB, 4:355; 
W.C.C. Claiborne to Captain Many, New Orleans, 18 May 1809, OLB, 4:358; W.C.C. Claiborne to Captain Many, 
New Orleans, 22 May 1809, OLB, 4:366-67; W.C.C. Claiborne to Captain Many, New Orleans, 3 June 1809, OLB, 
4:378. 
 
159 John Watkins to W.C.C. Claiborne, New Orleans, 2 February 1804, OLB, 2:5. 
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influx of slaves into American territory led to legal complications.  Article 1, Section 9 of the 
United States Constitution declared: “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the 
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to 
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight.”160  Congress chose to prohibit the slave trade in 
1808 but temporarily rescinded the decision for the relief of the refugees.161  Considering the 
language of the Constitution, the slaves entering Louisiana in 1809 could have been legally 
prevented.    
The planters arriving from Cuba brought their bondsmen and bondswomen with them, 
but they soon encountered local authorities who challenged their freedom to import their 
property.   Following the major phases of immigration in June 1809, the “negroes, having been 
introduced in violation of law, were seized, but it was thought to be one of those hard cases when 
humanity required that the law should be permitted to sleep, or at least that it should not be 
strictly and rigorously enforced.”162  The local population extended their efforts to allow slaves 
into Louisiana as they had done for the white émigrés and the free people of color.163  
Louisianans did not universally exhibit such goodwill, however, and some feared their graces 
would lead to regret; they may have been correct.164 
Enslaved refugees unnerved white Louisianans, American and Creole.  Many citizens, 
mostly Americans, urged Claiborne’s administration to prohibit the importation of slaves 
                                                 
160 United States Constituion, available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articlei.html#section9, accessed 10 March 2008. 
 
161 W.C.C. Claiborne to Julian Poydras, New Orleans, 28 May 1809, OLB, 4:372; Robert Smith to W.C.C. 
Claiborne, Washington, D.C., no date, Territorial Papers 9:881-82. 
 
162 Charles Gayarré, History of Louisiana (New Orleans: F.F. Hansell & Bro., Ltd., 1903), 4: 214.   
 
163 W.C.C. Claiborne to Robert Smith, New Orleans, 15 May 1809, OLB, 4:354; W.C.C. Claiborne to 
Julian Poydras, New Orleans, 23 July 1809, Territorial Papers, 9:843. 
 
164 Isaac Briggs to Thomas Jefferson, New Orleans, no date, Territorial Papers, 9:148. 
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entirely, but the humanitarian efforts and the need for labor in Louisiana outweighed whites’ 
fears.165  The knowledge and capital pouring into the vicinity of New Orleans helped to create a 
boom in sugar production.166  Aided by the refugees, planters acquired the additional labor and 
skills necessary to establish the sugar empire that later dominated the Lower Mississippi River 
Valley.   
 Progressing toward statehood, Claiborne and Louisianans remained cognizant of the 
obstacles they faced.  Initially they overcame the challenges before them, tempering their 
differences with patience and cooperation.  When thousands fled the Haitian Revolution, arriving 
in Louisiana after a brief exodus in Cuba, the movement marked a massive transition.  This 
overwhelming immigration pushed the social fissures beyond the breaking point and the territory 
finally erupted in insurrection in January 1811 as slaves attempted their own revolution, hoping 
to reproduce the outcome of the Haitian Revolution on American soil.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 W.C.C. Claiborne to Robert Smith, New Orleans, 29 July 1809, OLB, 4:392; W.C.C. Claiborne to 
Thomas Jefferson, New Orleans, no date, Territorial Papers, 9:340. 
 
166 Berquin-Duvallon, 40. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“TO KILL WHITES” 
 
Governor Claiborne tried desperately to stabilize Louisiana society by promoting 
harmony among divided social factions.  Succeeding initially, Claiborne’s administration 
encountered too many challenges to its authority.  In a territory already ripe for revolt when 
bought by the United States government, many catalysts began to act upon the territory, greatly 
affecting its inhabitants.  The Haitian Revolution tore Saint Domingue asunder as blacks 
overwhelmed whites, pushing them from the island entirely.  The immigrants fled to nearby 
Cuba but again found themselves exiled in 1809, relocating once again.  On this occasion, many 
of the refugees ventured to Louisiana where they found both open arms and distrusting hearts 
and minds.  The monumental influx of immigrants into the territory, which increased the 
population vastly, most notably among the blacks both enslaved and free, helped to produce the 
environment for revolution.  The immigrants with their potentially dangerous ideology, 
remembrances of events in Saint Domingue, and the demographic instability they caused all 
effectively increased the likelihood for revolt in Louisiana.   
Primary documents including Claiborne’s correspondence, the territorial papers, militia 
records, newspapers, and trial testimony all provide the necessary evidence to discuss the revolt.  
Although not entirely unbiased, the sources counter and complement one another, enabling me to 
produce a thorough account.  The slaves’ viewpoint may never be fully understood.  Because the 
1811 insurrection failed as a revolution, the African American memory of the event likely 
succumbed to the same suppression that quelled the rebellion.  Scholars of Louisiana’s past, and 
specifically of the 1811 rebellion, face distinct challenges that historians of the Haitian 
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Revolution do not encounter because the victors usually provide the bulk of the evidence for 
historical narratives.      
 The timing of the revolt resulted from the ability of the slaves to understand the changing 
seasons of the Louisiana sugar plantation complex.  Louisiana slaves often received a break from 
heavy plantation work during the Christmas and New Years’ period.  Though the holidays 
provided some respite, this rest came on the heels of an excruciating sugar harvest during which 
the slaves worked through the night to ensure a successful crop.  Because of periodic early frosts, 
Louisianans contended with shorter growing seasons than Caribbean sugar planters where the 
crop thrived.  Louisiana planters necessarily waited until the last possible moment before 
beginning the annual harvest.  As soon as the frost seemed imminent, the plantations exploded in 
activity as slaves cut and hauled the sugarcane out of the field for processing.  The kettles, used 
for cooking the cane to extract the sugar, required constant attention and a great deal of skill.  
The sugar cooking often took place through the night as masters and slaves worked side by side 
to fuel the fires with wood, constantly skimming the kettles, to prepare the “white gold” for 
shipment.167   
 With the harvesting period over, masters typically granted their slaves limited freedom 
and rest while the planters enjoyed the holiday season by attending balls and other social galas in 
New Orleans.  They constantly feared the slaves’ ability to rise in open rebellion, but they lacked 
organized militant racial control.  White Louisianans monitored slaves’ movements closely, but 
lacked the organization to mobilize the systematic control that typified the antebellum period and 
entrenched fear in all slaves.  In this way, the slaves led by Charles Deslondes exploited the gap 
                                                 
167 For more information on the sugar harvesting and making process, see Vernie Alton Moody, Slavery on 
Louisiana Sugar Plantations (New York: AMS Press, 1974); Richard Follett Sugar Masters (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2005); and Glenn R. Conrad, White Gold: A Brief History of the Louisiana Sugar 
Industry, 1795-1995 (Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1995).   
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in the whites’ vigilance.  They revolted at the time of year when white Louisianans let their 
guard down most, exposing their vulnerability. 
 Sometime during the night on Saturday, January 5, Deslondes met with his chosen 
lieutenants on the plantation of Colonel Manuel André.   Owned by a nearby planter, the Widow 
Deslondes, the approximately 30-year-old slave worked for André to fulfill a loan contract 
between the two planters. His ability to move between the two plantations and his connections in 
the slave quarters of both presented him with the opportunity to cultivate a plan for a rebellion 
involving a broad range of potential rebels.  The interrogation from the trial suggests that those 
attending the covert meeting with Deslondes on the André plantation included slaves named 
Charles, Harry, and Guam, and others unnamed.168  To avoid exposure, Deslondes made only a 
small handful of trusted slaves privy to the details of his plans.  Additionally, he and his co-
conspirators snuck out during the night of January 7 to detain a slave suspected as a spy on the 
Elizabeth Trépagnier plantation, rendering him incapable of compromising the rebellion.169   
With the plan for insurrection in place, runaway slaves inhabiting nearby maroon 
communities began to wage a campaign against the mail carriers along the German Coast to 
sever communication between New Orleans and Baton Rouge.  In preparation for potential open 
conflict with Spain over territorial borders, Governor Claiborne had requested, with immediate 
urgency, a boost to the regular soldiers in his region.170  General Wade Hampton arrived in New 
Orleans at the head of United States thirty Army regulars from Baton Rouge, only to receive 
                                                 
168 The records for the trial appear in Hahnville, Louisiana at the St. Charles Parish Court House.  
Additionally, a typed translation can be found at the Amistad Center at Tulane University and the New Orleans 
Police Headquarters at Broad and Tulane.  Louisiana St. Charles Parish, Original Acts [hereafter Original Acts], 
Act 17, 13-14 January 1811; Original Acts, Act. 2 Book 1810-1811, 7-16.  In these trial deliberations and 
testimonial, records indicate that Kenner and Henderson owned Harry while James Brown owned Guam. 
 
169 Original Acts, Act 20, 25 February. 1811, book 1810-1811. 
 
170 This conflict had festered since the Louisiana Purchase, challenging Claiborne’s authority but inevitably 
led to his adequacy of available troops when the insurrection occurred.   
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startling news from Claiborne.  The young official entreated Hampton to exhibit the “goodness 
to order an escort, for the Bearer who carries the Mail thro’ such part of the Territory, as you 
suppose may be infested by the Brigands.”171  At this point, the governor failed to understand the 
imminent slave rebellion he soon had on his hands.   
 Just after sundown on January 8, 1811, as whites along the German Coast celebrated 
another fruitful harvest and the holiday season, the territory of Louisiana erupted in open slave 
insurrection. Approximately thirty-six miles upriver from New Orleans, near present-day Norco, 
on the plantation owned by Colonel Manuel André, slaves attacked their slave drivers and 
master.  Charles Deslondes began the revolt with the plans he and his select group of “officers” 
had designed during the weeks preceding the rebellion.172  Court cases suggest that Deslondes 
and his lieutenants planned the entire rebellion carefully, intending to eliminate the white 
authorities and assume control of the territory.  The organization inherent in the insurrection 
countered directly a statement made by the Louisiana Gazette that “no mature plan had been 
arranged by the blacks, and the measures now adopted will ensure tranquility.”173  On the 
contrary, evidence suggests that the complicated plot called for Deslondes to march toward New 
                                                 
171 W.C.C. Claiborne to General Hampton, New Orleans, 7 January 1811, in Official Letter Books of 
W.C.C. Claiborne, 1801-1816, [Hereafter OLB] ed. Dunbar Rowland (Jackson, MS: Mississippi State Department 
of Archives and History, 1917), 5:94.  Quotations taken from primary sources will be cited literally as they appear in 
published works or manuscript.  This includes misspellings, italics, and sentence format. 
 
172 Historians have debated Deslondes’ origins, sometimes citing that he was a free man of color born in 
Saint Domingue who entered Louisiana during the 1809 immigration.  In a project currently underway, yet 
unpublished, Gwendolyn Midlo Hall presents irrefutable evidence that Deslondes was a Louisiana-born slave. 
 
173 As part of the Works Progress Administration, many of the area militia records, including those of the 
1811 slave rebellion were transcribed at Jefferson Barracks in New Orleans.  Located in Hill Memorial Library at 
Louisiana State University, these militia records also include articles that appeared in local newspapers pertaining to 
the rebellion providing a useful collection of information relating to details of the insurrection.  W.P.A. Historical 
Military Data: Louisiana Militia, 1811-1814 [hereafter Louisiana Militia], 9.   
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Orleans while insurgents in the city attempted to overtake the arsenal.174  Whether or not 
Deslondes planned the disturbances in New Orleans or even learned of them until later is 
difficult to determine given the evidence that exists.   
During the initial assault Colonel André’s son, Gilbert, fell victim to the rebellion.  
Reporting his experience to Claiborne, Gilbert’s father described himself, remorsefully, as “one 
of the principal sufferers.  An attempt was made to assassinate [André] by the stroke of an axe, 
and [his] poor son ha[d] been ferociously murdered by a hord of brigands.”175  The governor 
replied, sending his condolences to the colonel: “I sympathize with you, in the untimely and 
unfortunate death of your amiable Son.  But our lamentations are useless.  He is gone to a better 
and a happier world!”176  The colonel, wounded, escaped to the west bank of the Mississippi 
River and sought assistance in forming an organized vigilante force consisting of local farmers 
and planters to put down the insurrection.  After the 1795 Point Coupeé plot and the 1807 Aaron 
Burr conspiracy, local planters had stockpiled arms at the André plantation, a point the savvy 
Deslondes likely knew. 177  The stockpile of weapons on André’s plantation probably resulted 
                                                 
174 In the National Archives, Albert Thrasher found references to disturbances in the city as reported by the 
occupants of St. Charles Fort on the defensive perimeter of New Orleans. Albert Thrasher, On to New Orleans!: 
Louisiana’s Historic 1811 Slave Revolt (New Orleans: Cypress Press, 1996), 56-57. 
 
175 Manuel André to W.C.C. Claiborne, German Coast, 11 January 1811, in The Territorial Papers of the 
United States [hereafter Territorial Papers] ed. Clarence Edwin Carter (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1940), 9: 915-16. 
 
176 W.C.C. Claiborne to Colonel André, New Orleans, 13 January 1811, OLB, 5:97. 
 
177 Former Vice President Aaron Burr allegedly plotted to form an independent state in southwestern 
United States and campaigned for support throughout Louisiana including meeting with foreign groups from Mexico 
in New Orleans.  For an analysis of the conspiracy surrounding Burr see Buckner F. Melton, Aaron Burr: 
Conspiracy to Treason (New York: Wiley, 2001); Nancy Isenberg, Fallen Founder: The Life of Aaron Burr (New 
York: Viking, 2007).  Much of Gwendolyn Midlo Hall’s defining work Africans in Colonial Louisiana builds up to 
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inherent in the French Revolution and the Haitian Revolution.  For a detailed analysis of the Conspiracy, consult 
Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the Eighteenth 
Century (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 343-74.   
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from his service as the commanding officer for St. John the Baptist Parish.  Unfortunately for 
Deslondes’s followers, these weapons had been moved before January 1811, and his men and 
women found only a couple of muskets and sabers from the previously formidable André 
arsenal.178  Lacking arms and ammunition, the rebel slaves gathered makeshift weapons, 
including agricultural tools, and marched downriver to gather support.  As Jupiter, a Congolese 
slave from the André plantation, stated during his trial, they desired “to kill whites.”179  After the 
insurrection, Jupiter hid in the woods behind Jean Arnauld’s farm until captured by officials on 
February 7.  He had in his possession a gun, which he testified he “picked it up from one of the 
slaves killed during the encounter with the whites.”  After his testimony, the jury declared Jupiter 
a leader of the uprising and ordered “that he be hanged on the batture in front of Alesandre 
Labranche’s farm,” at 4 o’clock that afternoon.180   
 According to all contemporary accounts, the slaves marched downriver with calculation 
and organization.  Most narratives written by previous scholars, both biased and unbiased, have 
noted the well-thought militaristic order prevalent in the slaves’ movements.  Deslondes and his 
lieutenants acquired horses from the André plantation and rode at the head of the rebel column, 
encouraging their followers onward.181  The army soon reached the Deslondes plantation, 
Charles’s home, along the Mississippi River in present-day LaPlace.182  Pressing on to the 
plantation owned by Achille Trouard, they encountered Matherin, Trouard’s slave, who rallied 
                                                 
178 It is difficult to ascertain reliably the gender makeup of the force that revolted initially on the André 
plantation but by all accounts both men and women did partake in the rebellion.  Court records show that fifteen 
slaves were absent from the André plantation following the rebellion. 
 
179 Original Acts, Act 17, 20 Feb. 1811, book 1810-1811.  
 
180 Ibid. 
 
181 The Trial records give various instances as proof that the leaders of the rebellion rode on horseback. 
Original Acts, p. 12.  
 
182 Louisiana Moniteur, January 17, 1811. 
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his fellow bondsmen to join the rebellion and “fought with a saber in hand.”183  His master fled 
with his two nieces into the surrounding cane fields, hiding until January 12.184 
 Gaining strength at every plantation it passed, the army continued to move pleading with 
and forcing slaves to join their ranks.  Ten miles from the André plantation, they marched across 
the plantations of Jean Trépagnier and Francois Delhomme near present-day Montz.  At the 
Trépagnier plantation they solicited the aid of Big Baptist, a slave leader on the plantation, to 
garner additional support for the rebellious army.  Also, Hypolite, another slave, grabbed his 
master’s horse and fell in line alongside Deslondes at the head of the column marching against 
New Orleans.  Arriving at the plantation owned by François Trépagnier, they captured and 
executed François.185  An old Creole folktale details the death of Trépagnier, whereby his 
“loyal” slave, Gustave, rushed into his master’s personal chamber and “threw himself upon the 
man he hated, and others poured in after him.  The story is that the body was hacked into many 
pieces and tossed into the river,” while his wife and children escaped to the nearby brush, hiding 
from the slave army.186   
 Reportedly, support for the uprising strengthened at each plantation along the German 
Coast.  Additional participants joined the ranks at the plantations of Labranch, Bernoudi, 
                                                 
183 Court deposition indicated that seven slaves perished or went missing during the conclusion of the 
rebellion.  Original Acts, Act 2, book 1810-1811. Achille Trouard held the distinction of being the judge in St. John 
the Baptist Parish.  Henry Hopkins to W.C.C. Claiborne, New Orleans, 28 October 1809, in The Territorial Papers 
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186 Harnett T. Kane, Plantation Parade (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1945), 129.  
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Charbonnet, Butler, McCutcheon, Livaudais, and Arnould before marching on to the Destrehan 
plantation.187  The slaves of the Destrehan Plantation willingly joined the rebellion, including 
Big Hyacinth, a slave who rode horseback.  During their march, the rebel army razed a select 
number of plantation houses.  The burned houses may have resulted from the actions of specific 
slaves on those plantations who chose to burn their masters’ dwellings before joining the ranks 
of the rebellious army.  Numbering approximately five hundred, the rebels arrived on the Jacques 
Fortier plantation, twenty-five miles from their starting point.188  Here they planned to rest and 
fortify their spirits after the long, arduous trek downriver.  The next day, they hoped to march to 
New Orleans. 
 Meanwhile, Colonel André’s vigilante force had begun pursuit of the rebels.  Reporting 
his actions during the revolt to Claiborne, André wrote that he had “been able to collect a 
detachment of about eighty men, and although wounded, [had] taken the command of [his] brave 
fellow planters.”189  His outnumbered but determined and better armed force crossed the river to 
the east bank, hoping to make contact with the rebels.  André’s company met the rebels who 
appeared “colors displayed and full of arrogance,” near the Bernoudi plantation and the vigilante 
force “rushed upon [the slaves], of whom [they] made considerable slaughter.”190  Unable to cut 
the slaves off from the nearby woods, the white force allowed the servile army to “take to the 
woods, and the chiefs principally being on horseback, [had] made their escape with greater 
                                                 
187 Richard Butler and Samuel McCutcheon owned a large plantation, known today as Ormond Planation.  
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facility.”191  Understanding his position as a civilian, André informed Claiborne that “a 
detachment of regular troops would be very useful for the tranquility of our coast, because I am 
obliged to order many detachments of militia to meet and destroy the remaining of those 
brigands.”  He further stated his belief that by capturing the chiefs, whom he knew, the rebellion 
would end quickly.192            
 As the rebel army marched onward, some slaves, whom Albert Thrasher mockingly 
refers to as “so-called ‘loyal slaves,’ namely some of the most malicious drivers and several 
house slaves,” alerted their masters of the plans and events ocurring upriver.193  Their warnings 
allowed many planters to evacuate before the danger reached them, helping white casualties to 
remain minimal.  If not for the well-timed knowledge that a rebellion had taken place, German 
Coast inhabitants would have suffered on a scale that exceeded the Virginians’ during Nat 
Turner’s 1831 rebellion, the most deadly slave revolt in United States’ history.   
Most slave owners fled toward Destrehan Plantation in an effort to lead an evacuation of 
the German Coast to New Orleans.  Most assuredly, the planters experienced chaos and panic, 
but Albert Thrasher’s exaggerated description of the evacuation states “they were in a state of 
shock, bewilderment, complete desperation.  All of their pompous, airs, “’civilized behavior,’” 
and confidence that they bantered about and flung in the face of the slaves, now had completely 
evaporated.”194  An article written by a New Orleans resident to the New York Evening Post 
declared that “the women and children flocked to the town for refuge, and every face wore the 
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marks of consternation.”195  Their world under attack, the planters sent their women and children 
ahead to the city.  Leaving their plantations to the approaching army, slaveowners hauled their 
weapons with them, denying the rebels additional firepower.  Additionally, the information-
starved residents and administrators received valuable details about events taking place upriver.  
With few exceptions, whites successfully fled the path of the insurrection, gaining asylum inside 
the walls of New Orleans.196   
As news of the insurrection trickled inside the defensive fortifications of New Orleans, an 
alarmed Claiborne worked to mobilize his forces against the approaching slaves.  Watching the 
planters’ families flood the city, a visitor to New Orleans wrote that “the women and children 
came pouring into the city from the upper suburbs, bringing the most terrible accounts.”197  On 
January 9, the governor proclaimed that “the whole militia of the city and suburbs of New 
Orleans, are ordered into immediate service,” detailing each individual militia units’ orders.198  
The governor appointed Colonel F. Dutillet, Major M. Fortier, Captain G.W. Morgan, Messrs. 
Thomas Urquhart, John Clay, Lewis Serre, and Anthony Lamarlere as aides-de-camps to the 
commander-in-chief.199  Claiborne assigned Major Bullingney to take over as Commandant of 
the Patrols in the area.200  Claiborne and his administration expressed a strong desire for any 
information Bullingney could gather and ordered him to keep regular patrols throughout the 
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night.201  Additionally, the governor declared optimistically that New Orleans remained in 
“perfect safety.”202  On the same day, from his office at the Headquarters Government House, 
Claiborne ordered the immediate closure of all cabarets in the city and suburbs.  He also forbade 
any black males from passing through the streets of New Orleans after 6 PM.203   
Matching the atmosphere in and around New Orleans as news of the revolt spread to the 
city, Claiborne’s initial correspondence appeared decidedly confused.  Louisianans’ historical 
ties to Saint Domingue foreshadowed the result of the rebellion should they fail to halt its 
advance toward the city.  Inhabitants who had migrated to Louisiana following the Haitian 
Revolution and family members who had heard the tales of the chaos on the island understood 
the enormity of their situation.  Gathering facts as the insurrection unfolded, Claiborne became 
increasingly focused. 
Soon, Claiborne notified Secretary of State Robert Smith that his fears of a slave 
insurrection had finally become reality.  The governor exclaimed that slaves along the German 
Coast had risen, reporting their numbers, he declared, varied from 180 to 500 participants.  But 
he assured the secretary of state that “the most prompt and effectual measures, have been taken 
for the protection of the persons and property of the Citizens.”204  Seeking a quick end to the 
rebellion, on the morning of the January 9, Claiborne ordered a detachment of United States 
troops and two companies of volunteer militia to march out of New Orleans to meet the rebels.  
Claiborne also raised the entire militia within New Orleans to combat potential insurgency 
                                                 
201 W.C. C. Claiborne to Major Billingney, 9 January 1811, OLB, 5:95. 
 
202 W.C.C. Claiborne to Several Colonels of Regiments and several Parish Judges on the Coast, New 
Orleans, 10 January 1811, OLB, 5:96.   
 
203 Louisiana Gazette, 10 January 1811. 
 
204 W.C.C. Claiborne to Robert Smith, New Orleans, 9 January 1811, OLB, 5:95. 
76 
 
within city limits, thus allaying the fears of its citizens.205  He understood his responsibility to 
prevent the vital city from falling to the rebels.  The entire central government for the territory 
lay within its boundaries, meaning New Orleans’s ability to stave off the insurrection affected 
Louisiana as a whole.  Should the city succumb to the rebels, the territory would likely fall under 
rebel control for a time as President Monroe scrambled all of his available militia and United 
States Army regulars and rushed them to Louisiana.  Claiborne and General Wade Hampton 
steeled their determination, vowing to prevent that fate from overcoming the young American 
territory.     
Claiborne directed his complete attention to the advancing African army.  After 
commanding Bullingney to begin patrols along the German Coast, Claiborne ordered Hampton 
“to order, a Guard to the Bayou Bridge, with instructions to the Officer to permit no Negroes to 
pass or repass the same.”206  He wished to create chokepoints to check the advance of the rebels, 
preparing for an eventual counterattack.207  In turn, the general ordered “down a Company of Lt 
Artillery & one of Dragoons to Descend from Baton Rouge & to touch at Every Settlement of 
Consequence,” to assert American authority over the rebel slaves in the area.  Without adequate 
evidence, Hampton laid the blame for the rebellion on the Spanish when he notified Claiborne 
that “the plan is unquestionably of Spanish Origin.”208  While local authorities, particularly 
Claiborne feared Spanish intentions since taking over Louisiana, and while concerns about 
Spanish plans led to increased instability in the territory, the 1811 insurrection almost certainly 
happened on its own accord, without European influences.   
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Communicating through the Louisiana Gazette on January 10, Claiborne announced the 
halt of the rebellion at the Fortier plantation after “several of our fellow citizens have been 
massacred, some dwelling houses burnt and others pillaged,” although evidence suggests that 
only two whites succumbed to the rebel army.  Further, he expressed his hope that the 
“inhabitants of New Orleans and its vicinity, will continue their vigilance, regular patrol service, 
by day and by night will be ordered and must be performed; it is considered essential to our 
safety.”209  While the rebellion appeared to be quashed, Claiborne continued to take every 
possible precaution for the safety of property and citizens, extending the patrols longer.210    
In a public letter written late on January 10 and appearing in the Louisiana Gazette on the 
same day, Claiborne warned his fellow Louisianans that “the persons and property of our fellow 
citizens are still menaced,”211  To the secretary of state, Claiborne exclaimed proudly the 
suppression of the rebellion, informing Smith that “the insurgents were attacked on [January 10] 
by a part of armed Citizens, under the Command of Col: Andre; several were killed, and 18 or 20 
taken.”212  Understanding his tenuous position in Louisiana, Claiborne took a very gracious and 
congratulatory line following the suppression of the revolt.  Writing congratulations to his militia 
leaders, Major St. Amand and Colonel André, the governor expressed his “sincere satisfaction to 
learn that the late atrocious Insurrection [had] been so early put down, nor can I too highly 
applaud the bravery activity and firmness of my fellow Citizens.”213  Further, Claiborne argued 
that the rebellion had legitimized his long-time desire to better organize the local militia.  Hoping 
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to resolve the matter, Claiborne suggested that the territorial legislature, scheduled to meet in 
early January until the slave uprising interrupted its plans, vow not to adjourn until they 
addressed his demands for a stronger militia.214  
 The insurrection seemingly halted, Claiborne began scaling back the on-duty militia and 
phasing Dubourg’s free black militia detachment out of service, but continued to keep vigilant 
patrols on night watch with other active units.  Thanking him and his command for “their 
patriotism and bravery, accompanied with my best thanks for the Services they have rendered the 
Territory,” Claiborne declared Dubourg’s detachment no longer necessary.215  Claiborne 
followed up his letter to Dubourg with his full report to the secretary of state.  He declared the 
rebellion “quelled; and nearly the whole of the Insurgents either killed or taken,” and praised 
General Hampton for “the prompt and judicious movement [that] contributed very much to the 
public safety.”216  Claiborne also credited the militia for making “an impression upon the Blacks 
that will not (I suspect) for a length of time be effaced.”217  As Louisiana continued to progress 
toward statehood, Claiborne hoped to assuage the fears of Louisianans and those in Washington, 
D.C., proving that he maintained control over his post and possessed the resources to suppress 
insurrection without external assistance.  Claiborne’s hope for a seamless transition toward 
statehood might explain, in part, the lack of reliable information.  While the governor certainly 
did not campaign to eradicate sources that would slander his handling of the rebellion, he could 
have tempered his correspondence to minimize the perception that he required federal assistance 
to govern his territory.  
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The Louisiana Gazette printed an article on Friday January 11, 1811, identifying the 
leader of the rebellion.  Giving a fleeting account of the insurrection itself, the story continued: 
“several of [the fugitive slaves] soon after returned and surrendered amongst which is Charles, a 
yellow fellow, the property of Mr. Andre, who was the leader of the miscreants.”218  Here, the 
public learned the identity of the mastermind behind the rebellion for the first time, but historians 
continue to debate the heritage and true origins of Charles Deslondes. 
Nearly a week later, stories continued to appear in local newspapers, assuring the citizens 
of their safety and declaring the “brigands” and “banditti” suppressed.  The Gazette informed its 
readers that soldiers and militiamen continued to kill and capture the escaped fugitives, “ten or 
twelve of whom were brought to town [January 12]; and in a few days the planters can, with 
safety, return to their farms.”219  General Hampton publicly announced the “chiefs of the party” 
taken in hopes of allaying Louisianans’ fears of any further discontent or reorganization amongst 
the servile population.220  The Louisiana Gazette released its calculations for the number of slave 
casualties, stating “Thursday last of the negroes killed and missing, from Mr. Fortier’s to Mr. 
Andry’s and is as follows,” sixty-six killed and executed, seventeen missing, and sixteen “sent to 
New Orleans for trial.”  Estimating the slaves’ casualties at ninety-nine, the Gazette failed to take 
into account “those reported missing [who] are generally to be dead in the woods, as many 
bodies have been seen by the patrols.”221  Only after the planters returned to the German Coast to 
begin reassembling their plantations and counting their misfortunes, did a full inspection of the 
loss in chattel property occur.   
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The largest slave revolt in United States history ended after only two white casualties but 
the ramifications proved notable.  How did nearly 500 slaves revolt unexpectedly against their 
masters only succeed in killing two white men?  There are several reasons.  An ironic paradox 
developed when Claiborne’s militia proved its usefulness and resourcefulness in suppressing the 
attempted revolution although the uncertainty surrounding its maintenance early in Claiborne’s 
tenure contributed to the likelihood for revolt in the first place.  From the outset, Claiborne strove 
to balance the divided factions in the territory, in part, via the militia.  Vowing to create an 
adequate militia system at the behest of Jefferson’s national defense policy, the governor worked 
diligently.  The very challenge to Claiborne’s administration of disharmony, steeled his 
determination enough so that he advocated the change necessary to implement a useful territorial 
militia.   
Another reason for the slaves’ failure lay in their lack of firepower and the predictability 
of their movement.  Although their plan called for a complex overtaking of the central structure 
that governed the territory, the rebel army lacked adequate arms and ammunition.  Once they 
failed to get their hands on the weapons cache at the André plantation, they faced insurmountable 
odds.  As if their failure to acquire firearms were not enough, the slaves faced challenges from 
the geography of Louisiana.  General Hampton, himself referred to “roads half leg deep in Mud,” 
which the slave army slogged through doggedly on their march downriver, slowing their 
advance.222  The German Coast, a sliver of land along the Mississippi River, challenged the 
advancing army as well.  Early in the settlement stages, as planters ventured into the wilderness 
surrounding New Orleans and Baton Rouge, they encountered vast swamps of cypress trees that 
they had to clear to begin their plantations.  Planters settled along the river and began clearing 
the trees and draining the swamps away from the river.  This, in effect, created a funnel through 
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which the rebellion flowed toward New Orleans.  Nat Turner’s rebellion, the deadliest in 
American history, enjoyed advantages from a white enemy that could not guess easily their 
movements.  In contrast, Deslondes’ followers essentially had to march along the river from 
plantation to plantation allowing, Claiborne and Hampton to create chokepoints to check the 
advance of the approaching army.     
When the slaves failed to acquire the weapons they needed, the rebellion faced an uphill 
battle.  Lacking both the unpredictability to surprise white inhabitants and the firepower to 
overcome such a handicap, Deslondes and his followers fell short of their goal.  But if they failed 
to eliminate white authority in Louisiana, they still shook Louisianans to the core, frightening 
planters with a threat that lasted for many years.  Despite the measures taken by Claiborne’s 
administration and future leaders to tighten racial control, including increased patrols and a more 
vigilant militia, Louisianans never again felt complacent in their own safety.  Deslondes’s 
rebellion failed ultimately but it served as an example for later Louisiana slaves who sought to 
resist their masters’ wills.  The insurrection also served as an example for African American 
Louisianans for many years.  Despite the gap in the official historical record as left by whites, 
“the old Negroes still relate[d] the story of the slave insurrection of 1811 as they heard it from 
their grandfathers, as late as 1923.”223  Although the slaves failed in the rebellion and the revolt 
has failed to break into the history books in a thorough and objective manner thus far, the 
insurrection had a long-standing effect. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The 1811 insurrection resulted from overwhelming social tensions and newly-arrived 
ideology that presented slaves with the tools and opportunity to strike against their masters.  
Whether or not the slaves understood fully the social tensions that complicated whites’ ability to 
implement strict and consistent racial control over them would be difficult to ascertain, but they 
benefitted from the uneasy environment nonetheless.  Governor William Charles Cole Claiborne 
worked deftly to create a harmonious unified society from divided populations that preferred to 
live under French or Spanish rule.  An ethnic schism greeted Claiborne, the first American 
governor, when he assumed control of the Louisiana territory challenging his authority as rival 
factions jostled for their own respect and position in Louisianan society.  Old customs, including 
a bi-racial militia forced the governor to maneuver carefully to promote American ideals while 
respecting the traditions of the long-standing European powers.  The same militia, split along 
racial and ethnic lines, that so challenged Claiborne’s diplomatic abilities, saved the territory 
from potential disaster when the slaves revolted above New Orleans.  His attention, diligence, 
and determination in maintaining the militia provided the governor with a force that defended the 
territory from its intended target, slave insurrection.  Essentially, while the confusion 
surrounding the militia often contributed to the social tension, the attention directed by territorial 
officials toward the militia led to the successful suppression of the rebellion.   
 The final straw that tipped Louisiana toward open slave revolt, the largest in North 
American history, arrived with the refugees of 1809.  Exiled from Cuba after seeking asylum 
there after the Haitian Revolution, majority Creole whites, slaves, and free people of color 
contributed to the insurrection both directly and indirectly.  Just as Claiborne began creating 
unity among divided peoples, the additional Creoles from Cuba steeled the position of old 
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French Louisianans.  They reopened the ethnic schism and their numbers weighed heavily on the 
limited resources of the territory.  The exponential population growth over the course of a few 
weeks presented Charles Deslondes and his followers with the opportunity to rebel while white 
Louisianans distracted themselves by working to assimilate the vast newly-arrived population.  
The coincidental timing between the arrival of thousands of refugees who had experienced first-
hand slave rebellion that resulted from French revolutionary ideology and the outbreak of 
rebellion in Louisiana a mere eighteen months after their arrival proves significant.  Although 
Louisiana had always proven to be a potential breeding ground for slave revolt, the major 
insurrection did not occur until the revolutionary ideology arrived.  Essentially the 1811 rebellion 
in Louisiana continued the trans-national phenomenon of the Age of Revolutions.  In 1789 slaves 
on Saint Domingue observed the French Revolution in continental Europe, later punishing their 
masters for the hypocrisy of their actions in 1791 with their own revolution.  In turn, Louisiana 
slaves implemented their own interpretation of the previous revolutions by capitalizing on the 
tense situation that Governor Claiborne and the American authority occupied in the young 
territory. 
 Inevitably, the revolution failed but remained the largest slave revolt in North American 
history throughout the course of slavery.  An attempted revolution, the 1811 insurrection proves 
vital to the understanding of slavery in Louisiana and the United States as a whole.  Historically, 
Louisiana held the distinction as one of the most anomalous states in the union.  Its rich unique 
history that provided an ideal setting for revolt certainly affected its future as the rich sugar 
empire developed in the Lower Mississippi Valley.  Many questions remain unanswered and 
unexplored avenues for a better understanding still exist.  Historians need to understand how the 
pall cast over south Louisiana by the revolt affected planters as they moved forward into the 
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antebellum period.  Additionally a sense of why the rebellion continues to remain outside the 
mainstream historiography of American slave revolts and whether or not it holds a more 
prominent place in the oral or folk tradition of the white and/or black community of Louisiana is 
necessary.  Once historians push the historiography further and  more completeness is reached, 
maybe then Charles Deslondes and his fellow bondsmen and bondswomen will take their place 
in the historical record.   
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